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59 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (2024-2025)

handle is hein.journals/geolr59 and id is 1 raw text is: THROUGH SMOKE AND MIRRORS: EXCLUDING MALINGERING EXPERT TESTIMONY UNDER THE DAUBERT STANDARD Chunlin Leonhard & Christoph Leonhard* Because of science's claim to objectivity, scientific testimony is persuasive and often outcome-determinative. Our adversarial system incentivizes litigants to proffer scientific evidence to support their positions. The task falls on trial judges as gatekeepers to distinguish valid scientific evidence from junk science. Drawing this line is difficult because scientific evidence covers a broad spectrum. The United States Supreme Court has set forth the standard of admissibility of scientific evidence in Daubert and its progeny (the Daubert Standard). Trial judges are supposed to admit scientific evidence only if reliable and relevant under the Daubert Standard. But three decades after Daubert, despite the Court's expressed confidence in trial judges' abilities as gatekeepers, they have a mixed record: trial judges have failed to exclude junk science related to forensic feature-comparison methods, resulting in convictions of people later proven to be innocent. Has the Daubert Standard failed the trial judges? To answer this question, this article takes a deep dive into three decades of Daubert jurisprudence. Based on an extensive caselaw review, this article suggests that the Daubert Standard can be Chunlin Leonhard is the Leon Sarpy Distinguished Professor of Law at Loyola University New Orleans College of Law. Dr. Christoph Leonhard is Emeritus Professor of Clinical Psychology with The Chicago School of Professional Psychology at Xavier University of Louisiana. Dr. Leonhard received his Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from the University of Nevada, Reno and is Board Certified in Behavior Therapy by the American Board of Professional Psychology. He taught statistics and psychological research methods for over thirty years. The authors would like to thank Loyola University New Orleans College of Law and the Leon Sarpy Professorship for their support of this research project. The authors also thank Brian Huddleston, Senior Reference Librarian and Professor, for his diligent research assistance. The opinions expressed herein are the authors' alone. I