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18 Dartmouth L.J. 6 (2020)

handle is hein.journals/dcujl18 and id is 1 raw text is: MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY: HOW THE WORLD'S TWO LARGEST ECONOMIES REGULATE INSIDER TRADING THOMAS HARE TABLE OF CONTENTS 6 I. INTRODUCTION 6 A. Legal Versus Illegal Insider Trading 8 B. Current Legal Theories of Insider Trading in the United States 9 C. Arguments for Legalizing Insider Trading 9 D. Arguments Against Legalizing Insider Trading 11 II. AMERICAN REGULATING OF MISAPPROPRIATION 12 A. Duty of Confidentiality from the Chiarella v. United States Case 14 B. Tipper/Tippee Liability Under SEC v. Dirks 15 C. Misappropriation Theory Under United States v. O'Hagan 16 D. Expansion of Misappropriation Liability in U.S. v. Falcone 17 III. CHINESE APPROACH TO REGULATING MISAPPROPRIATION 18 A. Prohibited Trading Activities in China 18 B. Misappropriation Theory Under the 1998 Securities Law 19 IV. FIDUCIARY DUTY VERSUS NO FIDUCIARY DUTY: WHICH APPROACH IS MORE SUITABLE? 21 A. American Misappropriation Law Has a Gaping Hole 22 B. Other Problems with America's Approach to Misappropriation 22 C. Problems with China's Approach to the Misappropriation Theory 24 D. Which Approach Is More Suitable? 26 V. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS WITH MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY 27 A. Fixing the Problems with America's Misappropriation Rule 27 B. Correcting the Problems with Chinese Misappropriation Theory 29 VI. CONCLUSION 31 I. INTRODUCTION Prior to the government adopting policies of economic reform in the late 1970s, the People's Republic of China (the PRC or China) did not 6