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27 Crime L. & Soc. Change 1 (1997)

handle is hein.journals/crmlsc27 and id is 1 raw text is: Crime, Law & Social Change 27: 1-30, 1997. 1 © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. The Teamsters, the White House, the Labor Department * A commentary on the politics of organized crime ALAN A. BLOCK & SEAN PATRICK GRIFFIN Administration of Justice, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA Abstract. This paper examines the instrumental networks established between organized criminals and national politicians. Its major focus centers on the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Department of Labor, and the Reagan Administration. We explore the organized crime influence that affected President Reagan's selection of Raymond Donovan as Secretary of Labor. The choice of Donovan resulted in several related investigations into Donovan's association with organized criminals primarily in the construction industry in New Jersey and New York. We explain and critique the investigations thereby establishing the instrumental quality of the networks and the politics of law enforcement. Serious organized crime in American society is always political even though its most lurid manifestations are the private use of violence. Organized crim- inals, just like actors from the upper world, seek profit and power through influence and intimidation and ceaselessly work at developing networks of reciprocity with individuals who dispense political capital as well as those directly concerned with law enforcement. These high-stakes networks are sub- ject to so much contingency, including often deadly competition for access to those with resources to dispense, that all the participants live in a world of great uncertainty. Sometimes they succeed and other times they fail. There is a very complex interplay between the underworld and upperworld with power shifting back and forth among individuals. For example, the manager of a criminally-run legitimate enterprise such as a construction firm seeks to curry favor with those in politics who award construction contracts. Some targets are willing to deal others are not. To determine those who are willing, various intermediaries are called upon such as bond agents, insurance brokers, and lending institutions to scout the field. But how can one be certain which scouts are reliable and which have unknowingly become part of competitive networks? The same uncertainty holds true when an upperworld political fig- ure using some willing intermediary from a law firm, wants something from organized criminals whether in the form of controlled votes for an election or * Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Chicago, November 1996.