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28 Const. Pol. Econ. 1 (2017)

handle is hein.journals/constpe28 and id is 1 raw text is: Const Polit Econ (2017) 28:1-17 DOI 10.1007/s10602-016-9209-7 CrossMark uI!(, A I I\ l' \ 1'1 h Tullock on the organization of scientific inquiry Jac C. Heckelman1 Published online: 24 March 2016 © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016 Abstract In (Tullock, The organization of inquiry, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1966), Gordon Tullock sets out to establish how knowledge is developed and dispersed in science, to such a high degree of reliability, despite the lack of formal organizational structure. He contrasts this against the unreliability of the non-sciences. In this essay, I review his perspective and consider the validity of his proposed reforms. Keywords Methodology - Economics - Science - Knowledge JEL Classification Al - B2 1 Introduction Gordon Tullock produced two seminal pieces in the field of Public Choice on vastly different topics a mere five years apart; the landmark volume Calculus of Consent (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) which established a foundation on which much of constitutional economics was subsequently built, and his path-breaking article presenting the first formal model of rent-seeking (Tullock 1967). In between, he published several other articles and two additional books: The Politics of Bureaucracy (Tullock 1965) and The Organization of Inquiry (Tullock 1966). Unlike almost all his other works during this time period which helped develop parts I thank Roger Congleton for suggesting this topic to me and Dan Hammond for his comments on the first draft of this paper. ® Jac C. Heckelman heckeljc @wfu.edu Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA I_ Springer