About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline

LOG IN
LOG IN


17 Const. Pol. Econ. 5 (2006)

handle is hein.journals/constpe17 and id is 1 raw text is: Constit Polit Econ (2006) 17:5-13 DOI 10.1007/s10602-006-6790-1 ORIlAt AkI t IL The effects of issue salience on political decision-making Torsten J. Selck © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006 Abstract Game-theoretic models of political decision-making regard policy outcomes as a combined result of actor preferences and institutions. This paper explores the effects of adding relative issue salience to the analysis. I focus on non-cooperative models of complete and perfect information that are based on the concept of structure-induced equilibrium (Shepsle in Am J Polit Sci 23(1):27-59, 1979). Assuming a progressive agenda-setter and two conservative voters, I show how a change of the relative issue salience for players in a game results in a different equilibrium outcome in a political decision-making body. Keywords Decision-making Game theory Structure-induced equilibrium Issue salience JEL Classification C72 D72 1. Introduction For an organisation in order to change its policies, game theoretic models assume that actor preferences and institutional arrangements such as the price mechanisms or a certain voting rules are of central importance (Kreps, 1990: 3-6). Institutions are assumed to 'channel' preferences by specifying the strategies which actors in a decision situation have at their disposal. Whenever an individual is confronted with having to decide on two issues that are part of the same decision situation, there might be a difference in how important each of the issues are for the actor. This paper analyzes how the relative importance of one issue T. J. Selck (E) School of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, University of Nottingham, NG7 2RD Nottingham, UK e-mail: torsten.selck@nottingham.ac.uk h Springer