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4 C. L. Dig. 1 (1974)

handle is hein.journals/ceawest4 and id is 1 raw text is: An information service for college and university adminis- trators and attorneys. Published bimonthly by The National NFCL1A~ 4;11Association of College and University Attorneys J961 Vol. 4, No. 1 - January, 1974 Thoms E. Blckwel, Editor CAMPUS SECURITY California Braxton v. Municipal Court for the City and County of San Francisco, 100 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1972); affirmed, 109 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973). Seven individuals, charged with misde- meanors for having entered upon the campus of San Francisco State College after they had been notified that consent for their entry had been withdrawn, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition on the ground that the wording of the statute under which they were charged is unconstitutionally vague and uncertain. The trial court rejected their petition. A state court of appeals, in affirming the decision below, held that the statute in question, providing that the chief administrator of a college, or one designated by him to main- tain order on the campus, may notify a person of the withdrawal of consent to remain on campus whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that such person has willfully disrupted the ordinary operations of such campus, is not unconstitutionally vague and uncertain. The California Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the state court of appeals, construed the statute to apply to physically disruptive conduct that not only constitutes a substantial and material threat to the ordinary college opera- tions in an emergency setting, but which also violates other criminal laws. The court also read into the statute the following pro- cedural due process requirements: (1) a notice of a hearing except in special emergencies; (2) a post-banishment hearing within seven days if the excluded individual requests one; (3) for eventual conviction, not only the forbidden trespass, but also the criminal character of the conduct that initiated the initial order of exclusion, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.