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55 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1 (2011)

handle is hein.journals/amjorpolisci55 and id is 1 raw text is: Legislator Success in Committee: Gatekeeping Authority and the Loss of Majority Control Ernesto Calvo University of Maryland ifiaki Sagarzazu Nuffield College, Oxford In multiparty legislatures, the largestparty or coalition may fall short of controlling a majority ofplenary seats. However, plurality-led congresses generally endow the largest parties with extensive agenda-setting prerogatives, even when plenary majorities are lacking. In this article, we present a model and compelling evidence describing changes in the strategic behavior of committee chairs when majority control is lost. Using a dataset that includes all the bills proposed to the Argentine House in the last25years, we estimatesuccess in committee in majority- andplurality-led congresses. Weprovide extensive evidence that the loss of majority control reduces the importance of the median voter of the plurality party while improving the success of the median committee voter. n multiparty legislatures, the largest party or coali- tion may fall short of controlling a majority of ple- nary seats.1 However, congressional rules generally endowthe largest party with extensive agenda-setting pre- rogatives, even if plenary majorities are lacking. How do plurality parties adjust to such partisan environments? Is the result more pronounced legislative gridlock or a change in the makeup of the legislation to be considered in committee and voted on the plenary floor? In this ar- ticle, we analyze the determinants of legislative success in committee2 and provide compelling evidence that the loss ofmajority support significantly alters the agenda-setting strategies of committee chairs. We show that, in plurality- led congresses, committee chairs pursue more permissive reporting strategies and delegate further gatekeeping re- sponsibilities onto the Chamber Directorate. To account for legislators' success in committee, we extend Cox and McCubbins's (2005) model of a dual-veto system to plurality-led congresses. We show that resources available to senior party members to prevent legislation from being reported from committee far exceed their ca- pacity to sustain quorum on the plenary floor or to muster the votes required for final passage. Consequently, com- mittee chairs with extensive scheduling prerogatives need tobargainwithminorityleaders,whomaywithholdlegis- lation through the enforcement of quorum and reporting rules. To explain legislator success in majority- and plurality-led congresses, we analyze in detail 25 years of lawmaking in the Argentine House ofRepresentatives. We study legislator success in committee using over 29,000 law initiatives proposed by members of the Argentine House. Results show that the loss of committee majori- ties has little effect on the success of plurality-partymem- bers but results in a significant increase in legislative suc- cess among members of other parties. Overall, the loss of Ernesto Calvo is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 (ecalvo@gvpt.umd.edu). Ifiaki Sagarzazu is a post-doctoral fellow at the Center for Experimental Social Sciences, Nuffield College, University of Oxford (inaki.sagarzazu@nuffield.ox.ac.uk). We thank for their suggestions Juan Manuel Abal Medina (Jr.), Manuel Alcintara, Isabella Alcafiiz, Eduardo Aleman, Maria Baron, Miguel de Luca, Marcelo Escolar, Tulia Falleti, Flavia Freidenberg, Eduard L. Gibson, Mariana Gutierrez, Eugenio Inchausti, Noah Kaplan, Juan Pablo Micozzi, Mercedes Garcia Montero, Charles Munnell, MariaVictoria Murillo, Ana Maria Mustapic, Fernando Pedrosa, Susan Scarrow, Gisela Sin, Andres Tow, the participants of the Latin American Workshop at the University of Houston, and three anonymous reviewers. 'Data, code, and ancillary materials to replicate all analysis may be downloaded from http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/calvo/. 2We use the term success in committee to describe success in discharging a bill for further consideration by the plenary floor. In the U.S. Congress literature, Anderson et al. (2003) provide the only systematic analysis we know of success in committee. In related research, Krutz (2005) presents a novel analysis of winnowing, measuring the probability that a bill will be placed for the consideration of committee members. Our focus on the success of individual legislators differs from prior research explaining how the loss of majority control affects executive success (Canes-Wrone and de Marchi 2002; Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004; Figuereido, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000; Howell et al. 2000; Mayhew 1974; Saiegh 2009) or how fragmented congresses limit (or not) the range of policies available to the president (Ames 2001; Amorim Neto, Cox, and McCubbins 2003). American Journal ofPolitical Science, Vol. 55, No. 1, January 2011, Pp. 1-15 02010, Midwest Political Science Association DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00476.x 1