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52 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1 (2008)

handle is hein.journals/amjorpolisci52 and id is 1 raw text is: Aristotle and the Eleatic Stranger on the Nature and Purpose of Political Life Kevin M. Cherry University of Notre Dame This article argues that Book I ofthePolitics representsAristotle's critique ofPlato's Eleatic Stranger on the specific character ofpolitical rule and the knowledge required for political rule, and that this critique produces a different understanding of the proper division of regimes and the relationship between political theory andpractice. These differences can be traced to a morefundamental disagreement about nature: Aristotle sees nature as generally hospitable to human life and argues that the natural end or goal ofpolitical association is not mere life but the good life, while the Eleatic perceives nature as hostile andproposes a minimalist politics, aimedprimarily atpreserving life. Although the Eleatic's view of nature might appear to be closer to and more compatible with modernpolitical thought, the conception ofnatureAristotle presents in his Politics offers richer possibilities for political theory and political life. The Beginning of the Politics ommentators often observe that Aristotle's Nico- machean Ethics concludes with a transition to his Politics. Because the investigation of happiness and virtue ought to culminate in action, not just knowl- edge, Aristotle emphasizes the need to go beyond dis- courses which alone are insufficient for making people good (NE 1179b1-5). The first step of such an investiga- tion, he tells us, is to go through what has been well said by our predecessors (1181b16-17).1 Despite Aris- totle's clear indication that the examination of his pre- decessors will be the first step of his investigation, many commentators suggest that it does not occur until Book II of the Politics.2 There, Aristotle considers the regimes in speech proposed in Plato's Republic and Laws and those of Phaleas and Hippodamus and then turns to examine existingregimes said tobewellmanaged:the Spartan, Cre- tan, and Carthaginian. Most commentators read Book I as a sort of prologue, a necessary clarification of a certain reductionist tendency. Yet, in the very second paragraph of that first book, Aristotle disputes the opinion of his predecessors: Those who suppose that the same person is ex- pert in political [rule], kingly [rule], managing the household, and being a master [of slaves] do not argue rightly. For they consider that each of Kevin M. Cherry, Department of Political Science, 217 O'Shaughnessy Hall, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556 (kcherry@nd.edu). Versions of this article were presented at the 2006 Southern Political Science Association and Southwestern Political Science Association meetings, where I benefited from comments by Daniel Kapust and Devin Stauffer. The editors and anonymous reviewers of the journal helped to improve the manuscript, particularly in the first and sixth sections. Conversations with E. A. Goerner and David O'Connor have helped me to understand better Book I of the Politics. I am grateful to the Earhart Foundation and the University of Notre Dame for supporting this research and, in particular, to Catherine Zuckert for her careful review of the manuscript. 'Translations of the Nicomachean Ethics are from Aristotle (2002). For the Greek, I have referred to Aristotle (1988) and occasionally modified the translation accordingly. 2To be sure, almost all commentators cite the Eleatic as at least one of the thinkers criticized in this passage. However, most take only Book II as the review of his predecessors; see Kraut (2002, 183-84, 184n6); Newman (1950, 3); Rackham (1996, 642 n. a); and Voegelin (1985, 281). The notable exceptions are Cooper, who asserts that Aristotle devoted the whole first book of the Politics to the refutation of the Eleatic's notorious argument (1999, 75), and Schofield, who emphasizes that in Book I Aristotle's main preoccupation is not the naturalness of the polis but rather the question: how many forms of rule (ApX ) are there? And the urge to reply: 'notjust one but several' is the mainspring of the argument (1990, 17). Cooper, however, contends that the Eleatic abandons his notorious position by the end of the Statesman and becomes more Aristotelian, and I disagree with Schofield insofar as he identifies the Eleatic's view as both Socratic and Platonic. Moreover, neither Schofield nor Cooper explains how Aristotle and the Eleatic Stranger differ on the ends of politics, so neither is able to account for the reason why Aristotle takes the blurring among the kinds of rule so seriously that he begins his Politics by arguing against it. American Journal ofPolitical Science, Vol. 52, No. 1, January 2008, Pp. 1-15 ©2008, Midwest Political Science Association ISSN 0092-5853 1