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15 Armed Forces & Soc'y 9 (1988-1989)

handle is hein.journals/amdfcsad15 and id is 1 raw text is: Extended Deterrence And Nuclear Escalation: Options in Europe STEPHEN J. CIMBALA Pennsylvania State University This article examines the relationship between U.S. extended deter- rence and nuclear escalation as it applies to the deterrence of war in Europe. First, two logics of deterrence frequently used to explain this relationship are compared. Then the issue of conventional deterrence as it applies to Europe is reviewed. Third, the problem of nuclear force balances and essential equivalence as it applies to extended deterrence is considered. A final section offers summary conclusions. The relationship between the policy of extended deterrence and nu- clear escalation in the context of U.S. strategy is a complicated one. The discussion below indicates only some of the problems, but they are sufficient to perplex theorists and policymakers. How much NATO de- pends on the threat of nuclear escalation to deter war in Europe, and what that dependency implies for our understanding of Soviet behavior, could determine whether peace or war obtains. In addition, should war erupt in Europe, the nature of the conflict might be determined in part by the doctrines guiding U.S. and NATO planners in their force build- ing during peacetime. Also important with regard to the relationship between extended deterrence and escalation are the levels of confidence that U.S. European allies have in the reliability of U.S. nuclear guarantees. The discussion below assumes neither an imminent Soviet inten- tion to attack Western Europe, nor implacable Kremlin policy objec- tives that require decisive armed struggle against the United States or ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY, Vol. 15 No. 1, Fall 1988 9-31 ©1988 by the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society 1988 Fall | 9