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NSIAD-96-52R 1 (1995-12-04)

handle is hein.gao/gaobackzu0001 and id is 1 raw text is: United States GA () General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548 National Security and International Affairs Division B- 270468 December 4, 1995 The Honorable Sheila E. Widnall The Secretary of the Air Force Dear Madam Secretary: This is to inform you that we have completed our survey of the B-1B Conventional Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP). The major components of the CMUP are not scheduled to start until late 1996 and beyond, however, we would like to share some observations for the Air Force to consider as it begins to implement the CMUP. Our survey is one of several ongoing GAO audits that include the B-lB. The other audits are addressing such things as (1) the status of the Air Force's efforts to upgrade the computers and software for the CMUP and (2) the cost to keep bombers in the force and to modify them to use precision-guided munitions. These audits are still in process; therefore, the extent to which they will address CMUP issues is not known at this time. The survey discussed in this letter focused on the estimated costs and schedules for the various elements of the CMUP program, the technical risks and planned risk reduction efforts for each aspect of the program, and the current program status. Our survey indicated that the Air Force has established a sound plan for modifying the B-1B to enhance its conventional capability. We were especially encouraged by the emphasis being given to establishing an adequate test program for the CMUP, particularly as it relates to the defensive system upgrade portion of the program. This has been an area of concern to us during our past reviews of the B-1B program. As you know, because of pressure to maintain schedule, the B-1B was fielded with several unproven systems that, it was later learned, did not meet user requirements. In the case of the defensive avionics system, a new system was required. This situation occurred in large part because testing was sacrificed to meet the schedule for fielding the system. In our July 1982 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee during the early stages of the B-1B development program, we pointed out that although the B-lB Combined Test Force had recommended a 2,000-hour flight test program, a 1,000-hour test program was approved by the Air Force. We GAO/NSIAD-96-52R B-lB Conventional Upgrades / 5 5 07