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C-MASAD-81-2 1 (1981-02-18)

handle is hein.gao/gaobabcaq0001 and id is 1 raw text is: 




                         UNCLASSIFIED


 REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER         THE ARMY'S STANDOFF TARGET
 GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES      ACQUISITION SYSTEM--A
                                   PROGRAM HAVING DEVELOPMENT
                                   DIFFICULTIES


        DIGEST

        The Standoff Target Acquisition System (SOTAS)
        is a $1.1 billion Army program to develop
        an airborne radar system to detect and locate
        moving targets at distances far beyond the for-
        ward edge of the battle area. Although experi-
        mental SOTAS models have been fielded in Europe
        for about 2 years, a better model, operating
        from a new helicopter with an advanced radar
        and a jam-resistant data link, is now in devel-
        opment. (See pp. 1 to 3.)

        SOTAS can add a significant military capabil-
        ity to the Army. However, the system has ex-
        perienced technical difficulties which are
        causing significant delays in the program's
        sc4endil e av-q wh Ir-b r-n12Ids ciren a1 suhst Anti a4l
        cost overruns. Principally, the problems
        arose because SOTAS did not lend itself
        to the fast-paced development effort the Army
        has attempted in order to field the system
        quickly. The system's initial operating
        capability date has slipped several years.

        The Department of Defense chose to expedite
        development of SOTAS by curtailing some of
        the testing normally done in the advanced
        development phase and by placing the next
        phase--engineering development--on a very
        ambitious schedule. However, the system being
        developed in the engineering development phase
        is significantly different and more advanced
        than the model used in Europe.

        Difficulties have been compounded because

        --the most critical components involved ad-
          vanced technology and were creating techni-
          cal problems that were not anticipated by
          the Army and its contractors (see pp. 7
          and 8);


Inzrbffj. Upon removal, the report               
COver date shoujd be noted hereon.              C-MASAD-81-2
                        UNCLASSIFIED


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