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LCD-79-112 1 (1979-04-16)

handle is hein.gao/gaobaayzk0001 and id is 1 raw text is: B E LEA S E D EsTn , m - ,,A ,,, be r -- . ,.-'- ...- .... Aceoun~ng Ofe Wool*a e e bas l *f g.Siie.fl. ms.81 by tVie'OKc6 Of C40gqiSS toIMs2Ss COMFITROLAER GENERAL OF T14E UNITED STATIES WASINGTOK D.C. am B-168707 APRIL 16,1979 The Honorable Jamie L. Whitten Chairman, Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives Dear Mr. Chairman: 109125 Your February 26, 1979, letter requested that we review the Department of Defense's plan to purchase two satellites for the Defense Satellite Communications System, Phase II (DSCS II). Our findings, conclusions, and recommendations are summarized below. A more detailed discussion of the results of our review is provided in the enclosure to this letter. We have concluded that Defense's requirement for the Phase II satellites has not been justified. This require- ment is based on a theoretical gap in communications (caused by not having enough satellites in the phase's final years) before the operational Phase III (DSCS III) satellites become available. The problem with this theory, however, is that the two Phase II satellites could not be launched in time to fill any gap between the two phases. The earliest pos- sible launch of the two Phase II satellites could not occur before the Phase III satellites are scheduled to be in orbit and operational. Any difficulties with the remaining Phase II program, such as launch failures or catastrophic failures of on-orbit satellites, could not be alleviated by this addi- tional procurement. The justification for this procurement was enhanced because Defense Communications Agency program officials used a different criterion than that used by Air Force officials responsible for the satellite procurements to determine the numbers of satellites needed to maintain system availability. This rule change resulted in an apparent need for the two satellites, but, in our opinion, the need is neither appro- priate nor practical in terms of actual satellite deliveries and launch schedules. On the basis of Air Force records showing realistic Phase II and III launch dates, we conclude that the gap predicted by the Defense Communications Agency will not occur unless the Phase II satellites either fail prematurely in orbit or they fail to attain orbit. However, the launch of the two new Phase II satellites would not occur before the Phase III satellites become operational. LCD-79-112 (941182)