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PSAD-78-124 1 (1978-07-07)

handle is hein.gao/gaobaaxrd0001 and id is 1 raw text is: DOCUMIENT REStEE 06640 - fB19269531 [Alleqgd Contractor Deficiencies in Modifying Minuteman Missile Systeml. PSAD-78-12'4; B-146876. July 7, 1S78. Beleased July 14, 1978. 5 pp. * enclosure (12 pp.). Report to Rep. Ron flarlenee; by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller Geae ra 1. issue Area: Federal Procurement of Goods and Services: Nctifying the Congress of Status of Impcrtant Ficcurement krograms ( 05). Contact: Procurement and systems Acquisiticz Div. Budqet Function: National Defojnse: Department of Defense - Procurement & Contracts (058). Orqanization Concerned: Department of Defense; Department of the Air Force: Malmstrom AFE, MT; Boeing Co.; B. C. Smith Construction. Congressional Relevance: Rep. Ron Marlenee. Authority: Air Force Contract Management Livi~lon Regulation 74-1. Quality assurance deficiencics were alleged in the Air Force program to modify Minuteman silos at Malmstrcm Air Force Base. The principal Air Force contract is bith the Boeing company. The allegations relate mainly to work performed by the subcontractor, H.C. Smith Constructicn, and involve substandard welds, routie acceptance of work not meeting specifications, inadequate testing and use of test results, lack of qualified inspectors, nonperformance of required visual inspections, and the implications of these problems on national sectrity. Bceing encountered quality problems in the belding processes that H.C. Smith Construction used in the modification process. The Air Force acceptea JO silos before it discovered tke weld Ercblem, and these silos are now suspected cf having sukstandard welds. There was no evidence that the Air Fcrce rcutineiy accepted work reported as defective by its iispectors. If the Air force knowingly accepted work not in confcrmance kith ccntract specifications, acceptance was justified cn the baris of ezoi.omic and technical merits. The contract specified visual weld inspection only, with no routine zequirements for physical testing. both Boeing and the Air Force used noncertified weld inspectors; until recently, the Air Fcxce provided little or no technical traininq to its weld inspectors. Ihere is no indication that any of these deficiencie4 till have any significant effect on system effectiveress or national security. (RRS)