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1 [1] (May 28, 2025)

handle is hein.crs/rsnmyprnce0001 and id is 1 raw text is: ICongressional Research Servce Inforrning the legislative debate since 1914 Updated May 28, 2025 Russian Military Performance and Outlook Despite the advantages of a larger recruitment base and defense industrial capacity, the Russian military has not been able to decisively defeat the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) since Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The Russian military has suffered significant losses in personnel and equipment. Its performance has been hindered by a rigid command and control structure, a weakened corps of trained and professional units, and a reliance on tactics that have contributed to high casualty rates. The Russian military, however, appears to remain a resilient and capable adversary and is likely to sustain its operational tempo in the near term. Since 2022, Congress has supported Ukraine's defense against Russia's renewed invasion through enacting five supplemental appropriations measures that have provided assistance to Ukraine. Members may consider the Russian military's condition and performance as they evaluate the state of the war, assess the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions on Russia, evaluate the Russian military's prospective reconstitution and longer-term threat to U.S. and European security, and deliberate about whether to appropriate further military or other assistance for Ukraine. Command and Control Despite attempted reforms to increase lower-level leadership and autonomy, the Russian military continues to operate with a Soviet-style centralized command. This centralized command style at the tactical level has contributed to the types of inflexible operations that led to previous failures and casualties. In May 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced longtime Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu with a former economic official, Andrei Belousov. This change came after persistent poor Russian military performance. Some observers assess that Belousov's appointment reflected the Russian leadership's recognition that the war in Ukraine is a longer-term challenge and that managing economic and defense industrial resources is key to sustaining Russia's war effort. Some observers argue that Russia's leadership prioritizes the political loyalty of officers over their battlefield effectiveness. Multiple Russian military leaders, including some reported to be highly competent, have been relieved of command (and in some cases imprisoned), seemingly for perceived criticism of or insufficient loyalty to Russian political leaders. Nevertheless, the Russian military leadership appears to remain a cohesive force. It has gradually consolidated various semi-independent security force units and organizations fighting for Russia and brought them under central command. Additionally, the military leadership has proven capable of adopting changes to force structure, operations, and equipment since the 2022 invasion. Observers continue to debate the speed and breadth of these changes. Some reforms appear to address specific problems, remain isolated to specific units, or have been implemented only after extended debate. Personnel Russia's leadership continues to encounter challenges to recruiting and training sufficient troops. Continued casualties and challenges fielding well-trained troops have hindered, but not stopped, Russian military operations. Casualties As of April 2025, U.S. officials estimate Russia has suffered over 790,000 killed and wounded. Other estimates place Russian casualties as high as 900,000. These rates arguably reflect Russia's continued use of high-casualty tactics-including a reliance on massed personnel attacks and massed artillery fire-and limited operational-level flexibility. Casualty totals likely include mobilized personnel, volunteers, members of the Russian National Guard, recruited prison convicts, and personnel from Russian-occupied Ukrainian regions. The loss of experienced soldiers has been particularly detrimental. Many of the casualties have been among Russia's elite and professional soldiers, as well as its junior officer corps. New recruits, including new junior officers, often have less training than those they are replacing, exacerbating the impact of the losses and seemingly eroding the effectiveness of some Russian military units. Some observers say the loss of experienced troops and junior officers will have a long-term detrimental effect on Russia's military capabilities. Recruitment and Mobilization In September 2024, President Putin issued an order to increase the size of the Russian military to 1.5 million active-duty troops. Russia's draft budget for 2025-2027 annually allocates 30 billion rubles (about $370 million at current exchange rates) for sign-on bonuses. Russian authorities announced a mobilization of 300,000 personnel (outside of Russia's regular draft) in September 2022 but have not announced another large-scale mobilization since, likely due at least in part to domestic opposition. Russian law prohibits the combat deployment of conscripts, leading the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to prioritize recruitment of contract soldiers. Contract recruits may earn high salaries as well as sign-on bonuses offered by both regional and federal authorities. MoD salaries may be several times the average Russian monthly wage (including sign-on bonuses reportedly as high as 22 times the monthly wage), as well as additional payments should soldiers be ,ittps://crsreports~congress~gov