About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline

LOG IN
LOG IN


1 [1] (July 13, 2026)

handle is hein.crs/goveutz0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Iran and Nuclear Weapons Production Updated July 13, 2026 Since the early 2000s, Tehran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities has generated widespread concern in Congress that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons. According to past U.S. intelligence assessments, Tehran had the capacity to produce nuclear weapons at some point but had halted its nuclear weapons program and had not mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. The status of Iran's nuclear program is unclear. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) withdrew inspectors from Iran after June 2025 U.S.-Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. The extent to which these attacks, as well as U.S.-Israeli airstrikes that began in February 2026, affected Iran's ability to produce nuclear weapons is unclear. Prior to the 2026 airstrikes, Iran was intending to try to recover from the devastation of its nuclear infrastructure, the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) of the U.S. Intelligence Community states. A June 2026 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran states that Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons. ackground Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 (u-235) isotope. Such centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. Tehran has asserted that its enrichment program is only meant to produce fuel for peaceful nuclear reactors. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which effectively is no longer in force, has required Iran to implement various physical restrictions on its nuclear program, as well as to accept specific monitoring and reporting requirements. During the first Trump Administration, the President announced in May 2018 that the United States was ending U.S. participation in the JCPOA. Over time, Iran stopped implementing many of its JCPOA obligations and scaled back JCPOA-required IAEA monitoring. Beginning in July 2019, the IAEA verified that some of Iran's nuclear activities were exceeding JCPOA limits. In February 2021, Iran stopped allowing the agency to implement JCPOA-mandated verification and monitoring activities, according to a June 4, 2026, report from IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi. Since 2021, the IAEA has implemented inspections and monitoring in Iran pursuant to Tehran's comprehensive safeguards agreement only. Tehran's expansion of an enrichment program beginning in 2019 has decreased the time needed to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon-an action frequently termed breakout. According to U.S. assessments, Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in late 2003. This program's goal, according to U.S. officials and the IAEA, was to develop an implosion-style nuclear weapon for Iran's Shahab-3 ballistic missile. A 2025 public U.S. intelligence assessment stated that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that the then supreme leader had not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003. Grossi stated on March 4, 2026, that the IAEA in June 2025 had no information indicating that there was a structured systematic [Iranian] program to build or to construct a nuclear weapon. The U.S. government assessed prior to the JCPOA that Iran had not mastered all the necessary technologies for building a nuclear weapon. Tehran may have resumed conducting work on such technologies. The 2024 ATA observed that Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons- development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device. This phrase is absent from 2024 and 2025 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) assessments of Tehran's nuclear program. The 2026 ATA states that the United States is monitoring Iranian WMD- related capabilities and actions following the 2026 attacks; the ATA does not address Iran's nuclear weapons activities. The JCPOA-mandated restrictions on Iran's nuclear program, as well as the agreement's Iran-specific monitoring and reporting requirements, supplemented Tehran's obligations pursuant to the government's comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement. Such agreements empower the agency to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes and to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material. These agreements also require governments to declare their entire inventory of certain nuclear materials and related facilities. Safeguards include agency inspections and monitoring of declared nuclear facilities. Prior to and after the JCPOA's January 2016 implementation, IAEA and U.S. officials expressed confidence in the ability of both the IAEA and the U.S. intelligence community to detect an Iranian breakout attempt using either Tehran's IAEA-monitored facilities or clandestine facilities. An ODNI spokesperson stated that the U.S. intelligence community was capable of detecting Iranian efforts to build a nuclear weapon, according to an August 9, 2024, press report. Estimated Nucdear eapons Deve opment T menes U.S. estimates concerning Iranian nuclear weapon development account for the time necessary to produce a sufficient amount of weapons-grade HEU and complete the remaining steps necessary for an implosion-style nuclear