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1 [1] (May 19, 2026)

handle is hein.crs/goveuau0001 and id is 1 raw text is: China: Nuclear and Missile Proliferation The U.S. government for decades has expressed concerns about China's proliferation of nuclear- and missile-related technologies to other countries, with recent focus on the threat of Chinese acquisition of U.S.-origin nuclear technology. (See CRS In Focus IF11050, New U.S. Policy Regarding Nuclear Exports to China.) Official U.S. government sources indicate that the Chinese government has ended its direct involvement in the transfer of nuclear- and missile-related items, but China-based companies and individuals continue to export goods relevant to those items, particularly to Iran and North Korea. U.S. officials also have raised concerns about entities operating in China that provide other forms of support for proliferation- sensitive activities, such as illicit finance and money laundering. ackground China did not oppose new states' acquisition of nuclear weapons in the 1960s and 1970s, the Department of State wrote in a declassified January 1998 report to Congress. According to a 1983 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), China had exported nuclear materials since 1981 that were not subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Beijing did so mainly to earn hard currency, the estimate assesses, explaining that the Chinese became aware in 1979 that they had insufficient resources for their initially grandiose modernization program and that they needed to generate more revenue through expanded foreign trade. Accordingly, the State Council directed its subordinate ministries in late 1979 to begin selling surpluses. Consequently, according to the NIE, Beijing ended its abstention from commercial trade in conventional arms and nuclear materials. During the 1980s and 1990s, China transferred nuclear and missile technology to other countries' weapons programs. China provided assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran. Beijing exported missiles to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. (See CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.) According to U.S. government reports and official statements, China significantly curtailed its nuclear- and missile-related transfers in the 1990s; Beijing also committed to improving the government's export controls. For example, the above-cited 1998 State Department report notes China's 1996 pledge to refrain from assisting unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, Beijing's 1997 changes to Chinese nuclear export policy, and other Chinese nonproliferation efforts. The United States has extensive nuclear cooperation with China, which is governed by a civil nuclear cooperation Updated May 19, 2026 agreement, renewed in 2015. (See CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.) The above- described changes in Chinese behavior took place after the two governments concluded their first nuclear cooperation agreement in 1985. Laws subsequently adopted by Congress required, as a condition for U.S. implementation of the agreement, the President to submit to Congress certain nonproliferation-related certifications, as well as a report about Beijing's nonproliferation policies and practices. President Clinton stated in a January 1998 letter to Congress that China had made substantial strides in joining the international nonproliferation regime, and in putting in place a comprehensive system of nuclear-related, nationwide export controls since concluding the 1985 agreement. Beijing acceded in 1992 to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) and has voluntary IAEA safeguards on its civil reactors. The treaty defines NWSs as those that exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All other NPT states-parties are nonnuclear-weapon states. According to the treaty, an NWS is not to transfer nuclear weapons to any recipient whatsoever or to in any way ... assist, encourage, or induce any nonnuclear- weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. China is also a participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)-a multilateral control regime for nuclear-related exports. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) performs an analogous function for missiles and related items. China is not an MTCR partner but has agreed to adhere to the regime's export guidelines. The Chinese government has continued to express support for the international arms control and nonproliferation regime. Director General of the Department of Arms Control of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fu Cong stated at a December 2020 conference, China is ready to enhance non-proliferation policy exchanges and cooperation with all countries. More recently, China's Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs Shen Jian declared in an August 26, 2023, statement to the Conference on Disarmament that China will cooperate to preserve and strengthen existing multilateral arms control, disarmament and Non-Proliferation institutions. A November 2025 Chinese white paper posits an urgent need to reinvigorate multilateral arms control. Current PrO0feratdon COncerns As noted, official U.S. government reports indicate that the Chinese government has ceased direct involvement in nuclear-related proliferation and transfers of complete