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1 [1] (May 11, 2026)

handle is hein.crs/govetzy0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Congressional Research Service Informing th leg s1ative dbate s: nee 1914 China Primer: U.S.-China Relations Updated May 11, 2026 Introduction The second Trump Administration has shifted the framing of U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China) away from that of the first Trump and Biden Administrations. Rather than portraying the United States and China as engaged in strategic competition, the second Trump Administration has stated its desire for a balance of power and a stable peace with the PRC. At the same time, it has pursued actions in the trade and defense arenas to counter China that appear to align more with a conception of China as a competitor. In its oversight and legislative activities, the 119th Congress has focused on the competitive dimension of U.S.-China relations, including by re-authorizing a House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (H.Res. 5) first established in the 118th Congress (H.Res. 11). Second Trump Administration Polcy_ The second Trump Administration outlined aspects of its approach to China in two major public documents, the National Security Strategy (NSS), released in December 2025, and the National Defense Strategy (NDS), released in January 2026. Language about China in those documents is in places conciliatory and in other places combative, which could reflect strategic framing, policy differences within the Administration, or both. The NSS pledges that the Administration will [w]in the economic future in Asia, in part through a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing. The NSS also states that the Administration seeks to rebalance America's economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence. Nowhere does the NSS explicitly identify China as a competitor. The NDS states that, President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China. The NDS adds that the goal of the Department of Defense (which is using a secondary Department of War designation under Executive Order 14347, dated September 5, 2025) is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them, but rather, [t]o prevent anyone, including China, from being able to dominate us or our allies, and to achieve a balance of power in the Indo- Pacific that allows all of us to enjoy a decent peace. The NDS explicitly states that U.S. defense strategy with regard to China does not require regime change. At the same time, the NDS states that the United States will prioritize defending the U.S. Homeland and deterring China. The NDS makes no explicit mention of Taiwan, the self- governing democracy of 23.3 million people over which the PRC claims sovereignty. It does, however, state the Department's intention to erect a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain, a reference to the string of islands in Asia that include Japan, Taiwan, and parts of the Philippines and Indonesia. (See CRS In Focus IF12481, Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues.) In its reshaping of the executive branch, the second Trump Administration has reduced or ended the role of many entities previously involved in implementing China policy, and stood up some new entities. The Administration eliminated the White House National Security Council's Technology and National Security Directorate, for example, and established a new Bureau of Emerging Threats in the Department of State focused on threats at the nexus of technology and national security, many involving China. The Administration ended the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID's) former role in administering foreign assistance and transferred some of its former functions to the Department of State. That Department is now the sole administrator of the Countering PRC Influence Fund, which USAID previously co- administered. The Administration has sought to reduce other China-related entities, such as the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), to the minimum presence and function required by law. Global broadcasters that USAGM funds include Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, both of which broadcast into China. Additionally, the Department of State eliminated the position of Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights and shrank the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, as part of a larger reorganization. U.S. and PRC Leader Statements In his second term, President Trump has largely adopted a conciliatory tone in his public statements about China. On May 4, 2026, the President stated, We're adversaries, but we have a very good relationship.... And I think it's better to get along with China than it is to fight with China, and they feel the same thing. The President has stated that he has respect for China's leader, Communist Party of China General Secretary and PRC President Xi Jinping. At an October 2025 summit with President Trump in Busan, South Korea, Xi called for the United States and China to be partners and friends. According to a PRC readout, he stated that China has no intention to challenge or supplant anyone, and he called for the business relationship to serve as the anchor and driving force for China-U.S. relations. In a February 4, 2026, call with President Trump, Xi called for mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. Xi scheduled a video call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the same day as his phone call with Trump, appearing to signal, at a minimum, an equivalency between China's relationship with the United States and with Russia.