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1 [1] (March 26, 2026)

handle is hein.crs/govetwr0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Congressional Research Service ~nforrn ng the ag s tive debate since 1914 Updated March 26, 2026 Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are a special class of weapon systems that uses sensor suites and computer algorithms to independently identify a target and employ an onboard weapon system to engage and destroy the target without manual human control of the system. Although these systems are not yet in widespread development, it is believed they would enable military operations in communications-degraded or -denied environments in which traditional systems may not be able to operate. Contrary to a number of news reports, U.S. policy does not prohibit the development or employment of LAWS. Although senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials have not publicly confirmed whether the United States is developing or has developed LAWS, they have stated that the United States may be compelled to develop the systems if U.S. competitors choose to do so. (DOD is now using a secondary Department of War designation, under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025.) At the same time, a growing number of states and nongovernmental organizations are appealing to the international community for regulation of or a ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns. Developments in both autonomous weapons technology and international discussions of LAWS could hold implications for congressional oversight, defense investments, military concepts of operations, treaty-making, and the future of war. U.S. Policy Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter issued DOD's policy on autonomy in weapons systems, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09 (the directive), in November 2012. DOD has since updated the directive-most recently in January 2023. Definitions. There is no agreed definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems that is used in international fora. However, DODD 3000.09 provides definitions for different categories of autonomous weapon systems for the purposes of the U.S. military. These definitions are principally grounded in the role of the human operator with regard to target selection and engagement decisions, rather than in the technological sophistication of the weapon system. DODD 3000.09 defines LAWS as weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. This concept of autonomy is also known as human out of the loop or full autonomy. The directive contrasts LAWS with human- supervised, or human on the loop, autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the ability to monitor and halt a weapon's target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous, or human in the loop, weapon systems that only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a human operator. Semi- autonomous weapons include so-called fire and forget weapons, such as certain types of guided missiles, that deliver effects to human-identified targets using autonomous functions. The directive does not apply to autonomous or semi- autonomous cyberspace capabilities; unarmed platforms; unguided munitions; munitions manually guided by the operator (e.g., laser- or wire-guided munitions); mines; unexploded explosive ordnance; or autonomous or semi- autonomous systems that are not weapon systems, nor subject them to its guidelines. Role of human operator. DODD 3000.09 requires that all systems, including LAWS, be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force. As noted in an August 2018 U.S. government white paper, 'appropriate' is a flexible term that reflects the fact that there is not a fixed, one-size-fits-all level of human judgment that should be applied to every context. What is 'appropriate' can differ across weapon systems, domains of warfare, types of warfare, operational contexts, and even across different functions in a weapon system. Furthermore, human judgment over the use of force does not require manual human control of the weapon system, as is often reported, but rather broader human involvement in decisions about how, when, where, and why the weapon will be employed. This includes a human determination that the weapon will be used with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement. To aid this determination, DODD 3000.09 requires that [a] dequate training, [tactics, techniques, and procedures], and doctrine are available, periodically reviewed, and used by system operators and commanders to understand the functioning, capabilities, and limitations of the system's autonomy in realistic operational conditions. The directive also requires that the weapon's human-machine interface be readily understandable to trained operators so they can make informed decisions regarding the weapon's use. Weapons review process. DODD 3000.09 requires that the software and hardware of covered semi-autonomous and autonomous weapon systems, be tested and evaluated to ensure they