About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline

LOG IN
LOG IN


1 1 (February 4, 2026)

handle is hein.crs/govetld0001 and id is 1 raw text is: informing the Pegsative debate since 1914 Russian Military Performance and Outlook Despite the advantages of a larger recruitment base and defense industrial capacity, the Russian military has not been able to decisively defeat the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) since Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The Russian military has suffered significant losses in personnel and equipment. Its performance has been hindered by a rigid command and control structure, a weakened corps of trained and professional units, and a reliance on high-casualty-prone tactics. The Russian military, however, has implemented numerous reforms and is likely to sustain its operational tempo in the near term. Between FY2022 and FY2024, Congress supported Ukraine's defense againstRussia's renewed invasionby enacting five supplemental appropriations measures that have provided assistance to Ukraine. Members may consider the Russian military's condition and performance as they evaluate the state of the war, assess the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions on Russia, evaluate the Russian military's prospective reconstitution and longer- term threat to U.S. and European security, and deliberate about whether to appropriate further military or other assistance for Ukraine. Command and Control Despite attempted reforms to increase lower-level leadership and autonomy, the Russian military continues to operate with a Soviet-style centralized command. This centralized command style at the tactical level limits junior and mid-level officer decisionmaking authority and may contribute to inflexible operations. In May 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced longtime Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu with a former economic official, Andrei Belousov. Some observers assess that Belousov's appointment reflected the Russian leadership's recognition that the war in Ukraine is a longer- term challenge and that managing economic and defense industrial resources is key to sustaining Russia's war effort. Some observers argue that Russia's leadership prioritizes the political loyalty of officers over their battlefield effectiveness. Multiple Russian military leaders, including some reported to be highly competent, have been relieved of command (and in some cases imprisoned), seemingly for perceived criticism of or insufficient loyalty to Russian political leaders. Nevertheless, the Russian military leadership appears to remain a cohesive force. It has gradually consolidated various semi-independent security force units and organizations and brought them under central command. Additionally, the military has appeared capable of learning and adopting changes to force structure, operations, and equipment since the 2022 invasion. Observers debate the Updated February 4, 2026 speed and breadth of these changes, as some reforms appear isolated to specific units, or have been implemented only after extended deliberations. PerSOnne Continued casualties and challenges fielding well-trained troops have hindered, but not stopped, Russian military operations. Despite heavy casualties, the Russian military continues to recruit new soldiers and its leadership appears confident in its ability to replace casualties. Casualties Some Western and Ukrainian officials estimate Russia is losing as many as 25,000-35,000 casualties a month and that over 1.2 million have been killed and wounded since the war began. These rates arguably reflect Russia's continued use of high-casualty-prone tactics and limited operational-level flexibility. Russia's actual casualty rate also depends on the number of recoverable losses it sustains (those who are wounded and able to return to combat). Casualty totals likely include mobilized personnel, volunteers, members of the Russian National Guard, recruited prison convicts, and personnel from Russian- occupied Ukrainian regions. The loss of experienced soldiers has been particularly detrimental. Many casualties have been among Russia's elite and professional soldiers, as well as its junior officer corps. New recruits, including new junior officers, have less training than those they are replacing, exacerbating the impact of the losses and eroding the effectiveness of some Russian military units. Some observers say the loss of experienced troops and junior officers will have a long-term detrimental effect on Russia's military capabilities. Recruitment and Mob'zation In September 2024, President Putin issued an order to increase the size of the Russian military to 1.5 million active-duty troops. Russian authorities announced a mobilization of 300,000 personnel (outside ofRussia's regular draft) in September 2022 but have not announced another large-scale mobilization since. Russian law prohibits the combat deployment of conscripts, leading the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to prioritize recruitment of contract soldiers. Contract recruits earn high salaries as well as sign-on bonuses offered by both regional and federal authorities. MoD salaries may be several times the average Russian monthly wage, with additional payments should soldiers be killed or wounded. To meet manpower demands, Russia reportedly has imposed quotas on regions and lowered recruitment standards. The MoD also employs more coercive conscription and recruitment methods, including increased penalties for