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1 1 (March 2, 2026)

handle is hein.crs/govetjw0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Con re Won I Research Se informing I Iej~ I live (V )ate e I~ 14 Updated March 2, 2026 Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have defended and repelled Russian advances, despite ongoing disadvantages in personnel and a smaller defense industry. The UAF has demonstrated flexibility over the course of the conflict as well as an ability to integrate Western security assistance. Nevertheless, the UAF continues to face obstacles, including personnel and equipment losses. From FY2022 to FY2024, Congress enacted five supplemental appropriations measures to provide assistance to Ukraine. The UAF's evolving condition and performance may be of interest to the 119th Congress as Members weigh the impact of U.S. support for the UAF and potentially consider any further assistance to Ukraine or conduct oversight of U.S. policies toward Ukraine and Russia. Personnel Since the beginning of the 2022 war, the UAF has suffered high levels of casualties (data on Ukrainian casualties are sparse, but one estimate places UAF killed as high as 140,000), lowering force quality. In addition, desertion and draft evasion pose continued challenges to the UAF's ability to sustain operations. In January 2026, Ukraine's Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov estimated that 200,000 soldiers were absent without official leave (AWOL) and 2 million men were avoiding draft notices. After Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the UAF gained important combat experience fighting Russian-led forces in Ukraine's eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (known as the Donbas). In 2022, Ukraine was able to quickly mobilize these veterans and other volunteers into new volunteer Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and Reserve without the need for lengthy training. This arguably contributed to UAF effectiveness, since Ukraine did not have a fully developed professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. Many initial volunteers have been killed or wounded since 2022. Reportedly, the average Ukrainian soldier is over 40 years old, and some recruits have health or substance abuse issues. Ukraine passed legislation in April 2024 to address some recruitment issues. However, the government continues to reject some calls to lower the conscription age from 25 to 18, a policy that would likely meet with public opposition. In February 2025, the UAF implemented a new option for volunteers between the ages of 18 and 24 to sign one-year contracts in return for higher wages, a signing bonus, exemption from mobilization for 12 months, and other social benefits. While this option initially drew some interest, the UAF has struggled to recruit and retain younger recruits, and reports indicate recruitment officials have sometimes turned to more coercive methods. Train ng To replace losses, recruiting and training new personnel remain key tasks. The UAF faces a dilemma in seeking to adequately train new recruits amid demands to provide immediate reinforcements. Ukrainian officials have instituted new training standards, including centralized training centers and an increase in basic training to 1.5 months (up from one month). Despite improvements, most training for new recruits happens in their respective units. This arguably contributes to differing levels of capability across the UAF, as some more elite units prioritize training and provide quality instructors. Additionally, the UAF reportedly struggles to train officers for staff positions to assist commanders in managing and coordinating operations. A lack of trained staff officers has, in some cases, led to higher-level command staff coordinating and managing tactical operations. The UAF has announced organizational changes (such as organizing brigades under the command of a corps) to streamline management and coordination. Equipment The UAF operates a mix of Western and Soviet-era or Russian equipment and has sustained significant equipment losses during the course of the war. The UAF has exhibited resilience in the face of such losses, in part due to Western security assistance and concerted UAF maintenance efforts. The diversity of systems, continued losses, and varied supply, however, undermine UAF standardization. Ukrainian officials assert Western security assistance remains critical for supporting UAF operations. Ukraine has nearly exhausted its supplies of Soviet and Russian equipment (especially artillery and ammunition) and relies on security assistance for a variety of key systems, such as air defense and medium-range strike capabilities. Low supplies of artillery systems and ammunition have forced the UAF to adapt to other systems such as drones. Alongside Western security assistance, Ukraine's domestic defense industry has increased production and continues to innovate. Ukraine currently produces a wide range of systems, including drones (tactical and long-range strike), missiles, artillery systems, radar and electronic warfare, ammunition, and armored vehicles. Ukrainian officials maintain that a robust and capable domestic defense industry is essential to Ukraine's long-term security and for reducing the country's reliance on security assistance. According to one Ukrainian estimate, as much as 76% of the weapons and equipment the UAF needs is now produced domestically.