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1 [1] (January 8, 2026)

handle is hein.crs/govetdg0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Defense Primer: Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) The Department of Defense (DOD), which is using a secondary Department of War designation, under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025, is replacing many elements of the U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture as part of the United States' ongoing efforts to recapitalize its nuclear forces. This architecture-composed of what some estimate as 250 individual ground, space, and airborne systems spread across military services, combatant commands, and DOD components-supports the President's exercise of nuclear employment authority. (See CRS In Focus IF10521, Authority to Launch Nuclear Forces.) Some of this architecture, such as missile warning and tracking radars, overlaps with certain U.S. missile defense systems. U.S. NC3 systems must operate at all times, including during and after an attack on the United States, to sense and assess the operational environment; facilitate planning and decisionmaker conferencing; and transmit orders from the President to U.S. nuclear forces: bombers in the air, ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) underwater, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) deployed in silos across the Midwest. According to DOD, U.S. [NC3] is necessary to ensure the authorized employment and/or termination of nuclear weapons operations, to secure against accidental, inadvertent, or unauthorized access, and to prevent the loss of control, theft, or unauthorized use of U.S. nuclear weapons. The 2010, 2018, and 2022 Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPRs)-periodic executive branch assessments of U.S. nuclear weapons policy-highlighted the importance of modernizing NC3. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated in 2025 that DOD efforts to sustain and modernize NC3 would cost $154 billion from 2025 through 2034. Through defense authorization and appropriation legislation and hearings, Congress provides funding for and oversight of NC3 sustainment and modernization. Selected NC3 System Eements Early Warning Radars The Space Force operates a number of missile warning radars to detect and track potential incoming ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. These radars include capabilities like the Precision Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phased Array Warning System (PAVE PAWS), the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System (PARCS), and the COBRA DANE radar system. These missile warning radars are periodically upgraded. Updated January 8, 2026 Missile Warning and Tracking In 2011, the Space Force began deploying the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), a series of satellites and ground systems to detect and track the launch of adversary missiles. SBIRS satellites operate in geosynchronous (GEO) and highly elliptical orbits to observe missile launches worldwide. SBIRS is DOD's replacement of the 1970s Defense Support Program satellites. The Space Force is implementing the Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next-Gen OPIR) program to eventually replace SBIRS. Next-Gen OPIR is composed of several GEO satellites, several polar-orbiting satellites, and a ground system. In May 2024 testimony, then-Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration Frank Calvelli described Next-Gen OPIR as a bridge to a proliferated and resilient missile warning and tracking architecture in low and medium Earth orbits. The FY2026 DOD budget request included $3.5 billion in discretionary funding and assumed $9.4 billion in mandatory funding from FY2025 reconciliation legislation (P.L. 119-21), commonly referred to as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, for space-based missile warning and tracking. Hardened Satellite Communications The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) constellation is a group of hardened communications satellites operated by the Space Force. AEHF, first launched in August 2010, replaced the Milstar constellation from the 1980s. Paired with the Family of Beyond Line-Of- Sight Terminals (FAB-T) command post terminals, AEHF aims to provide assured communications for nuclear and conventional forces. In February 2024 testimony, then-U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Commander General Anthony Cotton stated that the AEHF constellation is fully deployed, while the command post terminals leveraging it are nearing fully-fielded status. The Space Force is developing a series of satellites under the Evolved Strategic SATCOM (ESS) program to eventually replace AEHF. The FY2026 budget request included $1.3 billion for ESS. ntegrated Tact ca Warn ng/Attack Assessment The goal of the Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) system is to integrate and collate warning data from terrestrial and space-based sensors, including ones detecting nuclear detonations, to assess whether an attack is occurring against North America or U.S. assets or allies. ITW/AA utilizes dual phenomenology-a process that draws on data from two independent information sources using different physical principles, such as radar and infrared satellite sensors to render and communicate its assessment to the President and U.S. military leaders. This system is periodically upgraded.