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1 [1] (December 11, 2025)

handle is hein.crs/govesyc0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Authority to Launch Nuclear Forces The U.S. President has sole authority to authorize the use of If te U.S. nuclear weapons. This authority is inherent in his event, constitutional role as Commander in Chief. The President comm can seek advice from his senior military leaders; those the Ch military leaders are then required to transmit and implement leaden the orders authorizing nuclear use if the President decides assess to employ nuclear weapons. As General John Hyten stated Presid in a congressional confirmation hearing, his job as the the cri Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) allies would be to give advice, while the authority to order a launch lies with the President. wor General Mark Milley, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs decide of Staff (CJCS), made a similar point in a memorandum he weapo provided to Congress in September 2021. He stated that he this au is a part of the chain of communication, in his role as the nuclea President's primary military advisor, but he is not in the who is chain of command for authorizing a nuclear launch. He report also stated that, if the President ordered a launch, the CJCS certai would participate in a decision conference to authenticate prepar the presidential orders and to ensure that the President was prepar fully informed about the implications of the launch. The President, however, does not need the concurrence of he wo either his military leaders or the U.S. Congress to order the Penta launch of nuclear weapons. Neither the military nor report Congress can overrule these orders. As former that th STRATCOM Commander General Robert Kehler has would written, members of the military are bound by the Uniform STRA Code of Military Justice to follow orders provided they are order legal and have come from competent authority. But select questions about the legality of the order-whether it is consistent with the requirements, under the laws of armed Opti conflict (LOAC), for necessity, proportionality, and Becau distinction-are more likely to lead to consultations and was, a changes in the President's order than to a refusal by the has st military to execute the order. design Nudear Command and Contro reach According to the Department of Defense's 2020 Nuclear syste Matters Handbook, nuclear command and control (NC2) that ti refers to the exercise of [Presidential] authority and U.S. direction, through established command lines, over U.S. contro nuclear weapons operations. NC2 is enabled by a nuclear proces command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture and la that provides the President with the means to authorize the amou use of nuclear weapons in a crisis and to prevent mecha unauthorized or accidental use. that th NC3 collects information on threats to the United States, eci communicates that information to the President, advises the President on response options, communicates the Durin President's chosen response to the forces in the field, and Soviet controls the targeting and application of those forces. (For retalia more information on elements of the U.S. NC3 system, see wit li CRS In Focus IF11697, Defense Primer: Nuclear scenar Command, Control, and Communications (NC3).) nuclea Updated December 11, 2025 NC3 systems identified an attack or an anomalous the President would participate in an emergency unications conference with the Secretary of Defense, airman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other military s. They would offer the President details and an sment of the possible incoming attack and explain the ent's options. According to the DOD, depending on sis situation, the President may consult with U.S. lduring the decision-making process. ding to one summary of the process, the President would then evaluate and respond to this information and whether to authorize the use of U.S. nuclear ns. He would communicate his choices and provide thorization through the Emergency Satchel (or r football)-a suitcase carried by a military aid always close to the President. The suitcase also edly includes a book with prepared war plans for n targets. The President could choose from these ed plans or, time permitting, ask STRATCOM to e an alternative. If the President did choose to respond with a nuclear attack, uld identify himself to military officials at the gon with codes unique to him. These codes are edly recorded on an ID card, known as the biscuit, e President carries at all times. Once identified, he transmit the launch order to the Pentagon and TCOM. STRATCOM would then implement the by preparing to launch the weapons needed for the ed option. ons for Nuclear Use se this system was designed during the Cold War, it s former director of the CIA General Michael Hayden ated, designed for speed and decisiveness. It's not ed to debate the decision. Long-range missiles attacking the United States from Russian territory could U.S. territory in around 30 minutes; sea-based ms deployed closer to U.S. shores might arrive in half me. If the United States wanted to retaliate before weapons, or, more importantly, the U.S. command and l system, were degraded by an attack, then the entire s of identifying, assessing, communicating, deciding, unching would have to take place in less than that nt of time. Given that some time would be needed for nical or administrative steps, some analysts estimate e President would have less than 10 minutes to absorb the information, review his options, and make his on. g the Cold War, U.S. doctrine argued that, to deter a attack, the United States would need to be able to te even if the Soviet Union launched a massive attack ttle warning. Hence, the United States planned for ios where the Soviet Union deployed thousands of r warheads that could reach the United States. The