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1 [1] (November 21, 2025)

handle is hein.crs/govesuj0001 and id is 1 raw text is: nform ing the Ieg siative dIebate a nee 1914 China: Nuclear and Missile Proliferation The U.S. government has for decades expressed concerns Chinese nuclea about China's proliferation of nuclear- and missile-related nonproliferatio technologies to other countries, with more recent focus on the threat of Chinese acquisition of U.S.-origin nuclear h technology. (See CRS In Focus IF1 1050, New U.S. Policy Regarding Nuclear Exports to China, by Paul K. Kerr and n Mary Beth D. Nikitin.) Official U.S. government sources deSC haNu indicate that the Chinese government has ended its direct involvement in the transfer of nuclear- and missile-related items, but China-based companies and individuals continue to export goods relevant to those items, particularly to Iran and North Korea. U.S. officials have also raised concerns about entities operating in China that provide other forms of support for proliferation-sensitive activities, such as illicit report about B finance and money laundering. 1998 letter to C Background strides injoini . and in puttingi China did not oppose new states' acquisition of nuclear weapons during the 1960s and 1970s, the Department of State wrote in a declassified January 1998 report to Congress. According to a 1983 National Intelligence Beijing accede Estimate (NIE), China had exported nuclear materials Treaty (NPT) a since 1981 that were not subject to International Atomic voluntary JAE Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Beijing did so mainly defines NWS a to earn hard currency, the estimate assesses, explaining other nuclear e that the China, France, Chinese became aware in 1979 that they had states. Accordi insufficient resources for their initially grandiose nuclear weapo modernization program and that they needed to any way ... ass generate more revenue through expanded foreign weapon state trade. Accordingly, the State Council directed its weapons. subordinate ministries in late 1979 to begin selling surpluses. Cn a ula Consequently, according to the NIE, Beijing ended its exports. The M abstention from commercial trade in conventional arms performs an an and nuclear materials. During the 1980s and 1990s, China items. China is transferred nuclear and missile technology to other adhere to the r countries' weapons programs. China provided assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and engaged in The Chinese g nuclear cooperation with Iran. Beijing exported missiles to for the internat Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. (For more information, regime. Fu Co see CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear Arms Control Cooperation Agreement, by Mark Holt, Mary Beth D. during a Dece Nikitin, and Paul K. Kerr.) enhance non-p According to U.S. government reports and official Ambassador fo statements, China significantly curtailed its nuclear- and an August 26, missile-related transfers during the 1990s; Beijing also Disarmament t committed to improving the government's export controls. strengthen exis For example, the above-cited 1998 State Department report and Non-Prolif notes China's 1996 pledge to refrain from assisting unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, Beijing's 1997 changes to Updated November 21, 2025 r export policy, and other Chinese n efforts. tes has extensive nuclear cooperation with s governed by a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, renewed in 2015. (See CRS Report RL33192, clear Cooperation Agreement.) The above- ges in Chinese behavior took place after the nts concluded their first nuclear cooperation 985. Laws subsequently adopted by red, as a condition for U.S. implementation nt, the President to submit to Congress iferation-related certifications, as well as a eijing's nonproliferation policies and sident William Clinton stated in a January Congress that China had made substantial ng the international nonproliferation regime, n place a comprehensive system of nuclear- wide export controls, since concluding the t. ed in 1992 to the Nuclear Nonproliferation s a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) and has A safeguards on its civil reactors. The treaty s those that exploded a nuclear weapon or xplosive device prior to January 1, 1967: Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All other NPT states-parties are nonnuclear-weapon ng to the treaty, a NWS is not to transfer ns to any recipient whatsoever or to in ist, encourage, or induce any nonnuclear- to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)-a multilateral control regime for nuclear-related issile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) alogous function for missiles and related not an MTCR partner but has agreed to egime's export guidelines. overnment has continued to express support ional arms control and nonproliferation ng, Director General of the Department of of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated mber 2020 conference that China is ready to nroliferation policy exchanges and cooperation with all countries. More recently, China's r Disarmament Affairs Shen Jian declared in 2023, statement to the Conference on hat China will cooperate to preserve and ting multilateral arms control, disarmament eration institutions.