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              S Congressional                                         __
      *. Research Service






The Twenty-Fifth Amendment and

Presidential Inability, Part 6: Final Approval

and Implementation



March   28, 2024

This Legal Sidebar post is the sixth in a seven-part series that discusses the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution. In an effort to ensure that the United States will always possess a functioning President
and Vice President, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment seeks to promote the prompt, orderly, and democratic
transfer of executive power. In particular, the Amendment establishes procedures for addressing
presidential inability and vacancies that arise in the presidency or vice presidency. Because Congress may
play a role in implementing the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, understanding the Amendment's history and
drafting may assist Congress in its legislative activities.
This Sidebar post discusses the Twenty-Fifth Amendment's implementation. Other Sidebars in this series
discuss the Twenty-Fifth Amendment's procedures; the framing of the Presidential Succession Clause at
the Constitutional Convention of 1787; the history of presidential succession; and the Amendment's
drafting in Congress and unresolved issues. Additional information on this topic is available at the
Constitution Annotated: Analysis and Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and in several CRS reports.

Final  Congressional Approval and State Ratification of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment

On February 19, 1965, the Senate unanimously approved the revised S.J. Res. 1, which proposed an
amendment to the Constitution on presidential vacancy, vice presidential vacancy, and presidential
inability. The House approved the revised H.J. Res. 1 as a substitute for the Senate joint resolution on
April 13, 1965, by a vote of 368 to 29. The houses convened a conference committee to reconcile
differences in the House and Senate versions of the joint resolution. As compared to the House resolution,
the Senate version featured a longer, seven-day time frame for the Vice President and a majority of the
Cabinet (or other body) to challenge a President's assertion that he had recovered from an inability under
Section 4. The Senate version also lacked the House version's specific deadlines for Congress to assemble
and resolve disputes between the President and the officials challenging the President's recovery
declaration.

                                                              Congressional Research Service
                                                                https://crsreports.congress.gov
                                                                                  LSB11136

CRS Legal Sidebar
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress