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Con   gressionaI Resea rch Service
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                                                                                         Updated October 9, 2023

U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: From the Merida Initiative

to  the Bicentennial Framework


Record drug overdose deaths in the United States and rising
homicides in Mexico, most of which never lead to
convictions, have led some in Congress to question the
efficacy of U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. The
homicide rate in Mexico tripled from 2007 to 2021,
reaching 28 per 100,000 people. Over the same period, U.S.
drug overdose deaths rose from 27,700 in 2007 to 107,000
in 2021. Some 66% of U.S. overdoses in 2021 were linked
to fentanyl. Since 2019, Mexico has replaced China as the
United States' primary source of fentanyl (with precursor
chemicals coming mostly from China), despite bilateral
efforts under the Merida Initiative that were supported by
$3.5 billion in appropriations from FY2008 to FY2021.

Congress may  evaluate lessons learned from the Merida
Initiative to inform funding and oversight of the U.S.-
Mexico  Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public
Health, and Safe Communities, adopted in 2021.

Origins of the Meria Initiative
Prior to FY2008, Mexico did not receive large amounts of
U.S. security assistance, partially due to Mexican sensitivity
about U.S. involvement in the country's internal affairs. In
March  2007, then-Mexican President Felipe Calder6n asked
for more U.S. cooperation to fight criminal organizations
and their cross-border trafficking operations. In response,
the Merida Initiative, a package of U.S. antidrug and rule-
of-law assistance to Mexico, began. As part of the Merida
Initiative's emphasis on shared responsibility, the Mexican
government pledged to tackle corruption. The U.S.
government pledged to address drug demand and the illicit
trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico. Both
governments have struggled to fulfill those commitments.

Initial  Phase:   FY2OO8-FY2OIO
Congress appropriated $1.5 billion for the Merida Initiative
from FY2008  to FY2010, including $420.7 million in
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which enabled the
purchase of equipment, including aircraft and helicopters,
to support Mexico's federal security forces (military and
police). Congress required the State Department to withhold
15%  of certain U.S. aid for the Mexican military and police
until the agency submitted an annual report stating that
Mexico  was taking steps to meet human rights
requirements. U.S. assistance focused on counternarcotics,
border security, and counterterrorism; public security; and
institution building. U.S. intelligence supported Mexico's
strategy of arresting (and extraditing) kingpins from each of
the major drug trafficking organizations, which
inadvertently contributed to intra-cartel violence.


The   Four-Pillars: FY20 I         -FY2OI
In 2011, the U.S. and Mexican governments broadened the
scope of bilateral efforts under four pillars.

    1.  Combating   transnational criminal
        organizations (TCOs)
    2.  Strengthening criminal justice sector
        institutions while protecting human rights
    3.  Creating a 21st-century U.S.-Mexican border
        while improving immigration enforcement in
        Mexico
    4.  Building strong and resilient communities
        through pilot projects aimed at violence
        prevention and drug demand reduction
Some  observers initially praised the initiative's breadth but
later concluded that the governments adopted too many
priorities without allocating adequate funding for them,
particularly on the Mexican side. For example, pillar two
received significant U.S. funding for courtroom
infrastructure, training, and equipment to support Mexico's
2008-2016 transition to an accusatorial justice system at the
federal and state levels. According to the World Justice
Project, however, the new criminal justice system is
unlikely to succeed without improvements in the
investigative capacities of Mexican police and prosecutors.

Final  Phase and Demise: FY2OI&FY2021
In January 2018, President Trump issued two executive
orders on combatting TCOs (E.O. 13773) and enhancing
border security (E.O. 13767) that refocused the Merida
Initiative. Controlling irregular migration became a central
U.S. goal, along with reducing synthetic drug production,
improving border interdiction, and conducting anti-money
laundering efforts. Analysts asserted that promoting human
rights and institutionalizing the new criminal justice system
were deemphasized.

Since taking office in December 2018, Mexican President
Andres Manuel  L6pez Obrador has criticized the Merida
Initiative and reduced federal security cooperation with the
United States, with the exception of migration enforcement.
In 2019, the L6pez Obrador administration disbanded the
federal police, which had received significant U.S.
equipment and training. It created a National Guard,
primarily composed of retired military officers, that has
limited investigative capacity and lacks civilian control
over its operations. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic
hindered bilateral cooperation. In October 2020, the United
States arrested former Defense Minister Salvador
Cienfuegos on drug charges; the move angered the Mexican
government, which further limited cooperation. Mexico's
Congress enacted a law requiring foreign law enforcement