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Updated June 8, 2021

Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons

The U.S. Department of Defense is pursuing two types of
hypersonic weapons technologies: boost-glide systems that
place a maneuverable glide vehicle atop a ballistic missile
or rocket booster, and cruise missiles that would use high-
speed, air-breathing engines known as scramjets to travelto
hypersonic speeds. This In Focus addresses only thefirst of
these technologies.
The Pentagon's FY2022 budgetrequest for hypersonic-
related research is $3.8 billion-up from $3.2 billion in the
FY2021 request. This increased funding and statements
from Pentagon officials demonstrate growing support for
weapons that could attackpriority targets promptly and
with improved accuracy withoutfacing defeatby an
adversary's air or missile defense systems. Pentagon
officials have also expres sed concerns about advances in
hypersonic weapons technologies in Rus sia and China, and
on the potential threats to U.S. forces, allies, and territory.
Characteristics of Hypersonic
Glide Vehicles
Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), like all weapons
delivered by medium- and longer-range rocket boosteis, can
travel at speeds of at least Mach 5, or about 1 mile per
second. The key difference between mis siles armed with
HGVs and missiles armed with ballis tic reentry vehicles
(i.e., thosethat travelon a ballistic trajectory throughout
their flight) is not their speed, but their ability to maneuver
and change course after they are released fromtheir rocket
boosters. In addition, although it is not necessary, many
concepts for the delivery of HGVs presume that the
boosters will launch along a flatter, or depressed, trajectory
than standardballistic missiles, and willrelease theirglideis
at a lower altitude of flight (see Figure 1).
Figure I. Flight Trajectory of Ballistic Missiles vs.
Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons

Source: CRS image based on an image in Gliding missiles that fly
faster than Mach 5 are coming, The Economist, April 6, 201 9.
Taken together, the HGVs' noveltrajectory and
maneuverability in flight would complicate a U.S. effort to
detect, track, and defend against an attack. The United

States wouldlikely detect the booster's launch, as it would
for the launch of any ballis tic missile, but it would notbe
able to predict the HGV's flight path. In addition, although
an HGV launched by a rocket booster would reach its taiget
far more quickly than a warhead delivered by an aircraft or
subsonic cruise missile (in minutes instead ofhours), it
would not travel faster than a ballistic reentry vehicle.
However, it would be more difficult to predict the intended
target and to direct mis sile defense interceptors toward the
attacking HGV.
Hypersonic Boost-Glide Programs
United States
When theUnited Statesbeganto assess themilitary utility
of hypersonic boost-glide weapons in the early 2000s, it
soughtto develop longer-range systems that couldreach
deep into an adversary's territory to attack defended,
hardened, and time-urgent targets. (For an overview of the
history ofU.S. programs, see CRS Report R41464,
ConventionalPrompt Global Strike and Long-Range
Ballistic Missiles: BackgroundandIssues, by Amy F.
Woolf.) More recently, the Pentagon has increased funding
and accelerated developmentprograms for shorter and
intermediate-range boost-glide systems that could conduct
prompt attacks ag ainst heavily defended targets in regional
conflicts. The Department of Defense (DOD) is developing
hypersonic weapons under the Navy's Conventional Prompt
Strike program, as well as through several Air Force, Army,
and DARPA programs. (Details ontheseprograms canbe
found in CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons:
Backgroundandlssuesfor Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.)
Unlike Russia and China, theUnited States is not
developing HGVs for use with nuclear warheads. As a
result, U.S. gliders may require greater accuracy and will be
more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-amid
Chinese and Russian systems.
Russia
Rus sia's HGV, known as Avangard, is equipped with a
nuclear warhead and deployed on SS-19 long-range land-
based ballistic mis siles. While SS-19 mis siles can carry six
nuclear warheads on a b allis tic trajectory, reports indicate
that they will deploy with only one Avangard HGV.
Avangardreportedly features onboard countermeasures and
will be able to maneuver in flight so that it can evade U.S.
ballis tic missile defenses. Rus sia conducted successful tests
of Avangard in 2016 and 2018. On December 27, 2019, the
Russian military announced that it had activated two SS-19
missiles equipped with Avangard.

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