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                                                                                                  April 2, 2021

Broker-Dealers and Payment for Order Flow


Introduction
The last few years have witnessed an unprecedented surge
in retail investor s ecurities trading at major dis count broker-
dealers such as Robinhood, Charles Schwab, TD
Ameritrade, and E*Trade. Among the factors that have
driven this are the zero trading commissions that many of
themnow  charge for trades. The non-existentcommissions
are often subsidized by a controversialrebate to the broker-
dealers called paymentfor orderflow (PFOF).

Market makers, alternatively known as wholesalers, make
cash payments to retail broker-dealer firms in exchange for
marketable retail customer stock order flows. In return for
this PFOF, market makers such as Citadel, Virtu,
Susquehanna, Wolverine, and Morgan Stanley typically
execute the orders in-house, called internalization. Market
makers also pay broker-dealers significant amounts of
PFOF  for order flow from stock options-contracts that
give an investor theright, butnotthe obligation, to buyor
sell a stock at an agreed-upon price and date. Such trades
are generally not internalized but are insteadroutedto
options exchanges such as the CBOE Options Exchange.

Figure 1. Aggregate PFOF  Revenue  from  Four Major
Brokerages

  Major brokerages included:
  TD Ameritrade, Robinhood,       $2.5
  E*Trade, and Charles Schwab    billion



                 $895
                 million



                 2019             2020

Source: CRS,with data fromAlphacution.
Notes: PFOF= Payment fororderflow.

Reporting fromAlphacution, a research firm, indicates that
aggregate PFOF revenue nearly tripled at fourmajor
broker-dealers-TD  Ameritrade, Robinhood, E*Trade, and
Charles Schwab-to  $2.5 billion in 2020 from $892 million
in 2019. By various accounts, PFOFhas played a
significant role in helping to lower retail broker-dealer
commissions and then helping to usher in the more recent
era of Robinhood-pioneered zero trading commis sions. And
because of this, it has indirectly helped generatea surgein
retail securities investing, which, according to the
investment bank Piper Sandler, grew from 13% oftotal
trading share volume in December2019 to 23% in
December  2020.


Alphacutionalsoreported that stockoptions-whichhave
been described as an accelerant in the speculative trading
ofmeme  stocks such as GameStop, AMC, Blackberry,
and Bed Bath and Beyond-accounted  for 61% of total
PFOF  in 2020.

Market Makers
Broker-dealers receive smallpayments, typically in
fractions of a penny per share, as their compensation for
routing orders to market makers. For major broker-dealers,
those pennies substantially add up. For example, total PFOF
revenue for the first half of 2020 were as follows: $271.2
million for Robinhood, $120.1 million for Charles Schwab,
$189.98 million for E*Trade, and $526.59 million for
Ameritrade.

So why are market makers willing to spend suchsums for
stock order flow? According to Georgetown University
fmance professor James Angel:

    [M]arket makers offer to buy from customers at
    their bid price and sell to them at a slightly higher
    offer or askprice. Competition frommarket makes
    and other investors keeps the bid-ask spread
    between  the bid and ask prices quite small. The
    market  makers   are  selling the  service of
    convenience  for investors who  want to  trade
    quickly. They are not long-term investors, nor
    should they be. Market makers particularly like to
    take the other side of small retail trades because
    they  know  that those  retail traders are not
    sophisticated institutional investors such as hedge
    funds. Market makers know that they can lose when
    they trade with large institutions that know more
    than they do. Market makers can buy from a retail
    order at the bid and sell at the ask or offer and
    pocket thebid-ask spread. They don't needto wony
    that retail investors as a group  have  better
    information and will dump shares on the market
    maker  just before  bad  news   is announced.
    Competition among  market makers for retail order
    flow is so intense that market makers are willing to
    pay for orderflow and offervarious levels ofprice
    improvement-prices  better than the nationalbest
    bid and offer (NBBO) prices [the best prevailing
    offers to sell and buy a given stock across vaious
    trading venues].

Best   Execution
For decades, PFOFhas been the subject of policy debates
on its merits and shortcomings by regulators, industry
stakeholders, academics, and Members of Congress. The
uproar in the winter of2021 surrounding the behavior of


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