About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline



1 [1] (March 3, 2021)

handle is hein.crs/govecmo0001 and id is 1 raw text is: 











China Primer: U.S.-China Relations


Updated March  3, 2021


Overview
In its early statements, the Joseph R. Biden Administration
has signaled significant continuity with the Donald J.
Trump  Administration in its characterization of the
challenge the People's Republic of China (PRC or China)
poses to U.S. interests. President Biden has referred to
China as our most serious competitor, stated that China is
challenging our prosperity, security, and democratic
values, and called on allies and partners to prepare
together for long-term strategic competition with China. In
written responses to questions from Senators, then-
Secretary of State-nominee Antony J. Blinken described
China as engaged in conduct that blunts our technological
edge, threatens our alliances and our influence in
international organizations, and is designed to make
America  and its allies more dependent on China, and China
less dependent on America and our allies. Secretary of
Defense Lloyd Austin, at his own confirmation hearing,
called China the most significant threat going forward.
China is already a regional hegemon, he said, and it seeks
to become the preeminent power in the world in the not-
too-distant future.

As it reviews the Trump Administration's China actions,
the Biden Administration has pledged to meet the challenge
from China by working closely with U.S. allies and
partners; re-engaging with the United Nations; ensuring the
U.S. military's ability to present a credible deterrence to
China; putting democratic values at the center of foreign
policy; and making investments at home in American
workers, infrastructure, education, and innovation. National
Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has acknowledged that
forging a common  position on China with European allies
will be challenging because we don't have entirely aligned
perspectives. Forging a common position with Asian allies
could be more challenging still, given their competing
strategic aims and their geographic proximity and close
economic  ties to China.

In their overtures to the Biden Administration, China's top
leader and other senior officials have called for dialogue
and cooperation, while also warning the United States to
keep out of China's internal affairs. In February 2, 2021,
remarks, China's top diplomat advised the United States to
respect China's positions and concerns on Taiwan, stop
interference in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang affairs,
and stop attempts to hold back China's development,
calling those issues a red line that must not be crossed.

Select   Issues   in U.S.-China Relations

Trade  and  Investment
China was the United States' largest goods trading partner
in 2020, even as U.S. imports from China fell by $100


billion between 2018 and 2020. Foreign direct investment
(FDI) flows have slowed since 2017, while other ties not
captured in trade and FDI data have expanded, including
financial investments and China's use of U.S. open source
technology platforms. U.S. concerns about China's trade
practices center on the expansive role of the state in China's
economy,  China's domestic restrictions in sectors in which
China is expanding overseas, and China's efforts to export
its rules and standards globally. China has been largely
unwilling to acknowledge and address U.S. concerns, which
are now evolving into broader considerations about how
China's actions may challenge U.S. competitiveness and
national security. The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-
19) pandemic exposed  supply chain risks and prompted
Congress to advance legislation, such as P.L. 116-136, to
encourage diversification, transparency, and some on-
shoring. A February 2021 Executive Order (E.O.) directs an
assessment of critical U.S. supply chains, building on
related Trump Administration E.O.s.

In 2018, the Trump Administration, acting under Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2411), concluded
that China engages in forced technology transfer, cyber-
enabled theft of U.S. intellectual property (IP) and trade
secrets, discriminatory and nonmarket licensing practices,
and state-funded strategic acquisitions of U.S. assets. In
response, it increased tariffs on approximately $250 billion
of imports from China. The PRC countered with tariffs on
$110 billion worth of U.S. products. Most tariffs remain in
effect. The United States and China signed a phase one
agreement in January 2020, in which China committed to
strengthen IP enforcement and remove some barriers, but
left most U.S. concerns unresolved. China committed to
buy $468 billion of U.S. goods, energy, agriculture, and
services over two years, but its purchases fell short in 2020.

Technology
To address China's industrial policies that seek civilian and
military technology leadership, the Trump Administration
sought to curtail U.S. technology transfer to China. It
increased scrutiny of academic ties, strengthened
investment review authorities, tightened export controls,
and banned U.S. investment in firms tied to China's
military. It banned PRC firms Huawei, China Mobile, and
China Telecom  from the U.S. market and encouraged other
countries to follow suit. Then-Secretary of Commerce
nominee  Gina Raimondo  declined to take a position on
China technology issues during her confirmation hearing.
The prominence  of these issues has focused attention on
possible nominees for Undersecretary of Commerce for
Industry and Security and their approach to dual-use
technology policy and licensing. The White House has said
it will not let PRC vendors of concern into the U.S. market
but has not addressed export controls and restrictions. It is


ittps://Crsreports.congress.g(