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               Researh Sevice





Activities-Based Regulation and Systemic

Risk



Updated December 9, 2019
Past financial crises have shown that systemic risk can emanate from financial firms or activities. It can
be caused by the failure of a large firm (hence, the moniker too big to fail) or it can be caused by
correlated losses among many small market participants. Although historical financial crises have
centered on banks, nonbank financial firms were also a source of instability in the 2007-2009 crisis.
The 2010 Dodd--Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) enhanced the regulation of certain financial firms and activities
to reduce systemic risk, particularly prudential regulation administered by the Federal Reserve (Fed) of
banks and nonbanks. All large banks were automatically subject to more stringent standards, as were
nonbanks designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), popularly known as
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). This can be classified as an institution-based
approach to addressing risks to financial stability at the firm level.
As discussed in this Insight, all four of the nonbanks that were designated by FSOC have since been de-
designated, and the size threshold for enhanced regulation of banks was increased. In December 2019,
FSOC finalized guidance to give precedence to an activities-based approach over an institution-based
approach for nonbanks-regulating particular financial activities or practices to prevent them from
causing financial instability. FSOC made future designations less likely by adding the following steps to
the process:
    * pursue a SIFI designation only if a potential risk or threat cannot be addressed through
       an activities-based approach;
    *  conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the designation, making a designation only if the
       expected benefits justify the expected costs that the [designation] would impose;
    *  assess the likelihood that a firm would become distressed; and
    *  create off-ramps before and after designation where SIFIs can address risks identified
       by FSOC to end designation.
International insurance regulation has also moved away from a focus on institution-based regulation and
toward activities-based regulation. The two approaches, however, need not be mutually exclusive.


                                                                  Congressional Research Service
                                                                    https://crsreports.congress.gov
                                                                                        IN10997

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