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1 1 (March 8, 2018)

handle is hein.crs/crsmthzzaby0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Congressional ______ ~~~Research Servite ~ nformrng the Ieg~Isative debate since 19!4 Does Executive Privilege Apply to the Communications of a President-elect? Todd Garvey Legislative Attorney March 8, 2018 Former White House Chief Strategist Stephen Bannon and outgoing White House Communications Director Hope Hicks both appeared recently before closed-door meetings of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as part of the Committee's ongoing investigation into Russian involvement in the 2016 election. According to reports, Mr. Bannon did not answer questions relating to the transition period between the election and inauguration. Ms. Hicks answered most, but not all, of the Committee's questions relating to that time period. One threshold question that appears central to these reports is whether executive privilege attaches to communications involving a President-elect prior to his inauguration. Executive privilege (or what is sometimes referred to by lower courts as the presidential communications privilege) is a relatively nebulous, constitutional privilege that protects the confidentiality of presidential communications on the grounds that [a] President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. The Supreme Court's only significant analysis of executive privilege (privilege) comes from a pair of cases involving President Nixon's unsuccessful attempts to maintain control over his communications and records. In United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), the Court rejected then-President Nixon's attempts to quash ajudicial subpoena issued at the request of a special prosecutor for recordings of conversations the President had in the oval office with close advisors regarding the Watergate break-in. In that case, the Court determined that absent a [] need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the President's generalized interest in confidentiality was outweighed by the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. Three years later, after President Nixon had resigned, the Court again disagreed with the former President's broad conception of the privilege-this time in relation to the disposition of his records after he left office. In Nixon v. GSA (ixon II), the Court rejected Nixon's challenge to the Presidential Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov LSB10094 CRS Legal Sidebar Prepared for Members and Committees of Conaress