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1 [1] (September 2, 2015)

handle is hein.crs/crsmthaafpc0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Arms Control Ratification: Opportunities for Modifying Agreements September 2, 2015 (IN10352) Amy F. Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy (awmoolfaTcrs, lc go, 7-2379) On July 14, 2015, Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany (the P5+1) finalized a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)-an ag=ment that restricts Iran's nuclear program in an effort to ensure that it can only be used for peaceful purposes. The Obama Administration and others who support this agreement contend that efforts by Congress to alter or amend the agreement would necessitate additional negotiations and, essentially, block a diplomatic solution. Some Members of Congress and others who oppose the agreement contend, however, that if Congress mandated changes and insisted on further negotiations, the United States could conclude a better agreement. Some note that, in the past, Congress has rejected or altered hundreds of international agreements. Accoring to one analyst, the Senate has added conditions to its consent to ratification, even when the agreements included numerous other participating countries. This has led, according to aanothan&ayt, to Congress playing a significant role in modifying important national security treaties or agreements. While it is true that the Senate has adopted conditions before consenting to the ratification of arms control treaties, this history does not provide a useful guide for the review process for the JCPOA, which is not a treaty. The Iran Ncea Agrteme -n Review Act contemplates congressional consideration of ajoint resolution of approval or disapproval, which, if enacted, could affect sanctions relief but could not amend the terms of the negotiated agreement. However, because the act does not place any express restrictions on the resolution's content, Congress could disapprove of the existing JCPOA and include provisions for conditional approval of an agreement with different obligations. Although possible, the Senate has never conditioned consent to an arms control treaty's ratification on changes in the terms of the agreement. In most cases, the conditions adopted during the Senate review were attached to resolutions of ratification and affected only U.S. activities, programs, and policies. Senate Review of Treaties The Senate role in the treaty ratification process is stipulated in Article II of the Constitution, which states that the President shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur. The Senate provides its advice and consent through the passage of a resolution of ratification. The Senate may attach conditions to its approval of a treaty, with amendments to the text and with reservations, understandings, and declarations codified in the resolution of ratification. If the Senate amended the text of the treaty, the President would have to transmit the amendment to the other parties to the treaty, leading to either further negotiations or abandonment of the treaty. Without agreement by all parties, the treaty could not enter into force. The Senate could also adopt reservations that constitute limits or qualifications that change the U.S. obligations in the treaty. A reservation must also be communicated to the other parties and, in a bilateral treaty, explicitly agreed to by the other party. This has happened on a few occasions during recent arms control history. Understandings and declarations attached to the resolution of ratification generally do not alter the obligations in the treaty and do not have to be approved by the other parties. An understanding is an interpretation or elaboration