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1 [1] (September 8, 2015)

handle is hein.crs/crsmthaafoy0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Legal Sidebar Cam ign Finance: First Amendment Challenge to Party Soft Money Limits 09/08/2015 A potentially significant campaign finance lawsuit is pending in federal district court. On August 3, 2015, the Louisiana Republican Party and two Louisiana local committees filed auil arguing that provisions of the B ina gn Ref rm A f 2002 (BCRA) that restrict the raising and spending of political party unregulated funds or soft money are unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Background: Soft money is a term used to describe funds that some argue affect federal elections, but are not subject to the limits and source restrictions of federal campaign finance law. As the Supreme Court has o, BCRA endeavored to take the parties out of the soft-money business. In general, Title I of BCRA prohibits national parties and their agents from soliciting, receiving, directing, or spending soft money. It further prohibits state and local party committees from spending soft money for federal gle ion activity; prohibits parties from soliciting and donating funds to tax-exempt organizations that spend money in connection with federal elections; prohibits federal candidates and officeholders from receiving, spending or soliciting soft money in connection with federal elections, and restricts their ability to do so in connection with state and local elections; and prevents circumvention of the restrictions on parties by prohibiting state and local candidates from raising and spending soft money to fund advertisements and other public communications that promote or attack federal candidates. In 2003, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the soft money restrictions in Title I of BCRA against facial challenges. (A facial challenge argues that a statute is unconstitutional in all circumstances, whereas an as-applied challenge argues that a statute, even though generally constitutional, is unconstitutional as it affects a specific plaintiff.) The Court determined that the restrictions satisfy the First Amendment test applicable to limits on campaign contributions, that is, that they are closely drawn to effect a sufficiently important interest. The Court considered the government's interest to be one of preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, and notably, refused to interpret that interest to encompass only the elimination of cash-for-votes exchanges. In its more recent rulings, however, the Court has ann that only quid pro quo corruption-the notion of a direct exchange of an official act for money-or its appearance constitutes a sufficiently important governmental interest to justify limits on both contributions and expenditures. Complaint: In ReDublican Partv ofLouisiana v. Federal Election Lommission, the plaintiffs maintain that provisions in Title I of BCRA restricting federal election activity, are unconstitutional under the First Amendment, both facially and as applied to independent communications, including those made on the Internet, urging voter registration or voting, and made from an independent-communications-only account (ICA). Plaintiffs further argue that, both facially and as applied to the communications listed above, the following provisions of BCRA are unconstitutional: the ban on state and local parties using soft money for federal election activity; the requirQmen that federally regulated funds be used for fundraising for federal election activity; and the requirement that federal election activity be reported so that federal election activity could no longer be allcae between federal and nonfederal accounts. In sum, plaintiffs maintain that the challenged provisions of law burden core political speech and association, which is highly protected under the First Amendment. Invoking the Supreme Court's 2014 ruling in M c£utcheon, the plaintiffs