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1 1 (July 3, 1997)

handle is hein.crs/crsaace0001 and id is 1 raw text is: 95-322 SPR Updated July 3, 1997 DOD's Dual-Use Strategy John D. Moteff Specialist in Science and Technology Science Policy Research Division Summary As part of its effort to reduce the costs of its military systems and gain greater access to state-of-the-art technologies, the Department of Defense (DOD) is pursuing what it calls a dual-use strategy. This strategy seeks to make greater use of the commercial sector in developing and manufacturing military goods. The strategy has two principal elements: acquisition reform to remove the regulatory and administrative barriers that inhibit greater use of commercial technology, and dual-use technology programs that actively seek to (a) develop new dual-use technology in cooperation with the commercial sector, (b) insert or spin-on existing commercial technology into military systems, and (c) spin-off existing military technology into the commercial sector. Acquisition reform has proceeded apace with bipartisan support. Dual-use technology programs, however, have generated much debate. While critics have been supportive of the dual-use strategy in principle, they felt the specific program initiatives, with their explicit concern with commercial markets, strayed too far from DOD's traditional programs. The 104th Congress eliminated the most visible of these programs, the Technology Reinvestment Project, but supported two new programs proposed by DOD. How best to pursue DOD's dual-use strategy will remain an issue in the 105th Congress. What Is Dod's Dual-use Strategy? The term dual-use refers to the character of a technology and/or product that has both military and commercial application. DOD's dual-use strategy is an attempt by DOD to integrate the military technology and industrial base with that of the commercial sector by using more commercially available components in its systems or using commercial production lines to manufacture unique military components. Over the years, DOD has come to rely (the extent to which is matter of some debate) on a dedicated technology and industrial base for the design, development, and production of systems and many of the components that go into those systems. For some systems, the reason for this is clear: there is no parallel demand in the commercial sector (e.g., tanks, submarines, nuclear warheads). However, for other systems (e.g., communications), there is a parallel Congressional Research Service o*o The Library of Congress CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web