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Congressional Research Service
lnforrning the legislative debate since 1914


                                                                                                     July 21, 2025

Automated License Plate Readers: Background and Legal Issues


Automated  license plate readers (ALPRs) are camera
systems that capture the license plate data of vehicles, along
with related information. They are generally available in
fixed and mobile formats. Fixed ALPR systems are
mounted  in specific locations, often using existing
infrastructure such as light poles, traffic lights, buildings, or
bridges. Mobile ALPR  systems are frequently mounted on
police vehicles or privately contracted vehicles. Although
details vary by system and jurisdiction, information
obtained from ALPR  systems may be included in certain
databases-whether  maintained by public or private
entities-that are accessible or searchable by law
enforcement. Law enforcement agencies use ALPRs  for a
variety of proactive and reactive policing purposes,
including to gather intelligence and evidence, help identify
potential suspects, and facilitate crime scene analysis.

Law  enforcement use of ALPRs raises a range of questions
for policymakers and the public. For instance, one
consideration is how ALPR use may, while aiding criminal
investigations, potentially infringe upon individuals'
privacy and civil liberties-in particular, Fourth
Amendment   protections from unreasonable searches and
seizures. In general, courts have found that mere
observation of an object in plain view does not implicate
the Fourth Amendment,  which suggests that law
enforcement's initial reading of a license plate using an
ALPR   is ordinarily not a Fourth Amendment search absent
additional circumstances. The ALPR caselaw typically
focuses instead on the related question of whether law
enforcement queries of certain databases containing ALPR
information amount to a Fourth Amendment search. No
federal appellate court has decided that issue, although one
circuit court judge discussed it in a concurrence. A number
of federal trial courts and some state courts have upheld law
enforcement access to such databases, while cautioning that
warrantless surveillance through ALPRs could violate the
Fourth Amendment   in some circumstances. This In Focus
provides an overview of ALPRs, select Fourth Amendment
caselaw on their use, and congressional considerations.

Background on ALPR Technology
ALPR   systems work by automatically capturing images or
videos of passing vehicles. An algorithm then detects and
reads the license plates within the photo/video. ALPR
technology can also detect and capture additional, related
information, including vehicle type and color, global
positioning system (GPS) location data, and date and time.
These tools also have the potential to identify individuals in
the photos/videos through the use of facial recognition
technology (FRT). After they catalog the license plate
information, ALPR systems can compare these data points
against various databases, including hot lists, which
contain a list of license plates linked to vehicles of interest.


If there is a match to a hot list license plate, the ALPR
system can alert a law enforcement officer in real time. The
retention of data from ALPR systems can also help law
enforcement track where vehicles have been over time.

ALPR  use is more common  in larger law enforcement
agencies than in smaller agencies. According to the Bureau
of Justice Statistics, nearly 90% of sheriffs' offices with
500 or more sworn deputies reported using the technology,
and 100%  of police departments serving over 1 million
residents used ALPRs.

The   Fourth Amendment and ALPRs
The Fourth Amendment   prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures and provides that no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause. A search for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment   generally involves (1) government
intrusion upon a person's reasonable expectation of privacy,
or (2) government trespass upon a constitutionally protected
space. If law enforcement activity is not considered a
Fourth Amendment   search or seizure, the Fourth
Amendment   inquiry typically comes to an end.

If law enforcement engages in a search or seizure, courts
probe whether law enforcement has a warrant, as the
Supreme  Court has generally established that a search or
seizure conducted without a warrant is presumptively
unreasonable. If there is no warrant, courts ask whether an
exception to the warrant requirement applies, as the
Supreme  Court has identified certain well-delineated
situations in which a warrant is not needed.

Third-Party  Doctrine  and  Carpenter
The Supreme  Court has held that a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties. This concept-
known  as the third-party doctrine-reflects a judgment
that a person takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that
person to the Government. In 2018, the Supreme Court
recognized a narrow limitation to the potentially more
expansive scope of the third-party doctrine in Carpenter v.
United States. That case involved the warrantless search of
historical cell-site location information (CSLI)-data
recording the location of a cellular device when it connects
to a set of radio antennas called 'cell sites,' typically
mounted  on towers or structures. The Carpenter Court held
that the CSLI was not exempt from Fourth Amendment
protection pursuant to the third-party doctrine, even though
the CSLI was shared by the defendant with cellular
providers in the course of his cell phone use. Given the
Court's observation that CSLI is generated automatically
and its view that carrying a cell phone is indispensable to
participation in modern society, it rejected the argument


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