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Case Citations [1] (July 2019 - August 2020)

handle is hein.ali/rettgp2430 and id is 1 raw text is: TRUSTS 3D Generally C.A.1, 2019. Cit. generally in ftn. In certifying to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court the question of whether a judgment creditor of a settlor's estate could reach and apply assets in an irrevocable spendthrift trust after the death of the self-settlor of the trust, this court noted that, under Massachusetts law and Restatement Second of Trusts § 156, a self-settled spendthrift trust did not protect assets from the settlor's creditors to the extent that the settlor retained use and control of the funds. The court noted that the Restatement Third of Trusts might have had some relevance to the issue, but that neither party had argued that its application would make any material change for the purpose of this case. De Prins v. Michaeles Trustee of Donald Belanger Irrevocable Trust dated October 28, 2008, 942 F.3d 521, 526. PART 1. NATURE, CHARACTERISTICS, AND TYPES OF TRUSTS CHAPTER 1. DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS § 2. Definition of Trust C.A.6, 2019. Com. (d) cit. in sup. After the district court entered judgment against debtor for liability on a loan guaranteed by debtor personally and in his capacity as trustee of a revocable trust, debtor appealed, alleging that creditor was not entitled to obtain relief from trust property, because the fact that debtor could revoke the trust at any time meant that the trust did not own the property. This court affirmed, holding that creditor could recover from trust property. The court rejected debtor's assertion relying on Restatement Third of Trusts § 74 that his ability to revoke the trust at any time deprived the trust of ownership interest in the trust property, and explained that the fact that creditors generally could recover from trusts despite trusts lacking equitable ownership of trust property under § 2, Comment d, demonstrated that such ownership interests were not a prerequisite for recovery by creditor. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 942 F.3d 748, 750. S.D.W.Va.2019. Quot. in sup. Estate administrator, a West Virginia resident, brought an adversary action against trustee, a North Carolina corporation, seeking declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the trust agreement. After trustee removed the action to this court, administrator filed a motion for remand, alleging that the parties were not diverse. This court denied administrator's motion for remand, holding that the parties were diverse, because the trust was a traditional trust whose citizenship was the same as trustee's. The court observed that the trust was a traditional trust as defined under Restatement Second of Trusts § 2 and Restatement Third of Trusts § 2, because decedent had transferred property to trustee pursuant to a trust agreement that described trustee's duties and powers. Wurts v. Branch Banking and Trust Company, 402 F.Supp.3d 335, 336. Colo.App.2018. Com. (d) quot. in sup. Taxpayer who had purchased two adjacent undeveloped parcels, built a house on one parcel, and transferred the undeveloped parcel to her revocable trust appealed after COPYRIGHT ©2020 By THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America For earlier citations, see the Appendices, Supplements, or Pocket Parts, if any, that correspond to the subject matter under examination.