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Case Citations [i] (July 2016 through April 2017)

handle is hein.ali/resttlph5307 and id is 1 raw text is: TORTS 3D: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM Generally C.A.10, 2016. Cit. generally in case cit. in sup. In an action filed by owner of a recreational boat to limit its liability under a maritime statute after the boat sank due to high winds, killing four boaters who had rented the boat for the day, this court vacated in part the district court's conclusion that owner was not entitled to limitation or exoneration under the statute because owner's negligence caused the accident, and remanded for further proceedings. In making its decision, the court noted that maritime courts had regularly looked to the Restatement Third of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm for guidance in determining questions of negligence. In re Aramark Sports and Entertainment Services, LLC, 831 F.3d 1264, 1279. CHAPTER 1. INTENT, RECKLESSNESS, AND NEGLIGENCE: DEFINITIONS § 1. Intent C.A.6, 2016. Com. (a) quot. in sup. Former federal prisoner, who broke his back by falling off a ladder while working in the prison, sued prison staff members, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that the Inmate Accident Compensation Act (IACA) was the exclusive means by which federal prisoners could receive compensation for employment-related injuries. This court reversed, holding that the existence of the IACA did not in and of itself suggest that prisoners were prevented from seeking redress when a prison official went beyond mere negligence and violated a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. The court noted that, under Restatement Third of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 1, the exclusivity of workers'-compensation schemes was typically limited to accidental injuries and did not prevent workers from bringing suit for intentional torts they suffered in the workplace. Koprowski v. Baker, 822 F.3d 248, 256. § 3. Negligence C.A.1, 2016. Com. (g) quot. in sup. Defendant was indicted for aiding and abetting her husband in violating a federal statute that prohibited convicted felons, such as husband, from possessing firearms, after she allowed her husband to use her semi-automatic rifle for target practice. The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict finding defendant guilty. Vacating in part and remanding, this court held that the jury should not have been allowed to convict defendant of aiding and abetting husband's unlawful possession of a firearm merely because she had reason to know that husband had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in prison, such that his subsequent possession of a firearm was illegal. The court cited Restatement Third of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 3 in reasoning that, having reason to know suggested a negligence standard that Aa For earlier citations, see the Appendices, Supplements, or Pocket Parts, if any, that correspond to the subject matter under examination.