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Case Citations [i] (Fall 2025)

handle is hein.ali/resdplltnt0046 and id is 1 raw text is: THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE Fall 2025 Citations PROPERTY 2D LANDLORD AND TENANT PART I. CREATION OF THE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP CHAPTER 1. NATURE AND DURATION OF LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP § 1.1 Requirement of a Space Having a Fixed Location C.A.11, 2024. Quot. in sup. In consolidated actions, holder of a 99-year usufructuary concession consisting of a waterfront terminal and piers at the Port of Havana, which had been confiscated by the Cuban government in 1960, sued cruise lines, alleging that cruise lines trafficked in the confiscated property in violation of the Helms-Burton Act by using the terminal and one of its piers from 1996 to 2001 and from 2016 to 2019. The district court granted summary judgment for concession holder. This court reversed in part as to the conduct taking place between 2016 and 2019 and remanded, holding that concession holder's limited property interest in the terminal and pier ended for purposes of the Act in 2004, when its 99-year concession would have expired by its own terms. The court noted that the Act's definition of property included leasehold interests and cited Restatement Second of Property: Landlord and Tenant § 1.1 in support of the proposition that a leasehold interest was necessarily restricted in terms of location and duration. Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 119 F.4th 1276, 1287. § 1.3 Capacity and Authority to Enter into the Landlord-Tenant Relationship Cal.App.2024. Quot. in sup. After tenant of a residential property failed to pay rent for over seventeen months, city, as landlord, filed an action for unlawful detainer against tenant and served her with a three- day notice to pay rent or vacate the premises. The trial court entered judgment for tenant, finding that the city's three-day notice was defective under the Unlawful Detainer Act for identifying city as the payee because the Act required payment to be made to a person. This court affirmed on other grounds, holding that the term person within the meaning of the Act was not, according to Restatement Second of Property: Landlord & Tenant Law § 1.3 and legislative history, limited to a natural person and included corporations or other entities. City of Alameda v. Sheehan, 325 Cal.Rptr.3d 438, 446. § 1.6 Tenancy at Will COPYRIGHT C2025 By THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America For earlier citations, see the Appendices, Supplements, or Pocket Parts, if any, that correspond to the subject matter under examination.